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HISTORY, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, AND LATCRIT THEORY:
THE CASE OF RACIAL TRANSFORMATIONS CIRCA THE
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR, 1896-1900
SYLVIA R. LAZOS VARGAS*
The period from 1896 to 1900, the period prior to, during, and im-
mediately following the Spanish American War, which became known to
Americans as the "splendid little war,"1 was a momentous time. An in-
depth study of this five -year period-the events leading to the Spanish
American War, the War itself and its aftermath-yields a rich and deep
understanding of themes at the core of LatCrit theory. This is a key turn-
ing point in racial formation of Latino/as,2 American foreign policy,3 and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. J.D., 1986,
University of Michigan. The financial assistance from the Llewellyn Research Fund of Missouri-
Columbia School of Law helped to make this work possible. I want to acknowledge the valuable
research assistance of Andrea Ravens and Petra DeWitt, and the support of the University of
Missouri-Columbia Law Library, particularly librarian Cindy Shearrer. This essay is based on my
presentation, What Cartoons Can Tell Us about the Formation of Race, National Identity and the
Origins of Tiered Racial Citizenship, 1896-1900, Panel on Puerto Rican Citizenship, LatCrit V
Conference, Breckenridge, Colorado, May 2-5, 2000. I want to thank the co-participants of the
panel, Robert Chang, Ediberto Roman and Carlos Venator Santiago, as well as the audience
participants, Devon Carbado, Pedro Malavet, Deborah Post, and Ruby West for their comments and
critiques. I also want to thank Kevin R. Johnson, Guadalupe T. Luna, Jean R. Sternlight and Petra
DeWitt, for their comments on early drafts of this paper.
1. This was Secretary of State John Hay's aphorism for the war. One of the better known
popular history books used this as its title. See FRANK FREIDEL, THE SPLENDID LInLE WAR (1958).
2. See generally JUAN F. PEREA Er AL, RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA 326-55 (2000) (linking racial tiering of citizenship for Puerto Ricans with the
Spanish American War); RUBIN F. WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF
RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLCY 1893-1946 (1972) (attitude that would
permeate dealings with the peoples of the insular possessions had been shaped through White
America's experience with, and treatment of, the Native Americans, the Chinese, the Japanese, the
African Americans); Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race and the Insular
Cases, in "FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE": PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE
CONSTITUTION (Christina Burnett & Burke Marshall eds.) (forthcoming Duke Press) [hereinafter
Manifest Destiny & Conquest]; Walter L. Williams, United States Indian Policy and the Debate over
Philippine Annexation: Implications for the Origins of American Imperialism, 66 J. AM. HIST. 810
(1980) (linking racial tiering of citizenship of the insular territories with the legal doctrines
developed with respect to the American Indians); Carlos Venator Santiago, Towards the Legal
Genealogy of the Construction of Race in Puerto Rico (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
3. Several of the leading books on the Spanish American War focus on the link between the
transformation of national identity and foreign policy. See generally ROBERT L. BESNER, FROM THE
OLD DIPLOMACY TO THE NEW 1865-1900 (1975) [hereinafter BEISNER, DIPLOMACY]; H. W.
BRANDS, BOUND TO EMPIRE : THE UNITED STATES AND THE PHILIPPINES (1992) [hereinafter
BRANDS, EMPIRE]; H. W. BRANDS, THE RECKLESS DECADE: AMERICA IN THE 1890s (1995); JOHN
DOBSON, RETICENT EXPANSIONISM: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF WILLIAM MCKINLEY 19 (1988);
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American democracy.4 The U.S. abandoned its isolationist stance, and
awkwardly embraced its "duty and obligation" as a "benevolent" world
power.5 Thus, the United States became an equal among European impe-
rialist countries like Great Britain, Germany and France, which were
already carving up Africa, Asia, and the Pacific and subjecting these
6peoples to the colonialist experience. Some would argue that the SpanishAmerican War is the pivotal historical event for LatCrit theory.
Part I provides a historical brief of the Spanish American War, and
describes the many ways that the Spanish American War is just not dead
history, but continues to impact Puerto Rico and Guam, native Hawai-
ians, the Philippines, Cuba, and Latin America. Part II discusses just how
important the Spanish American War is to the issues that concern the
LatCrit enterprise. Part M generally discusses the importance of histori-
cal analysis to the understanding of the construction of race. Part IV sets
forth how LatCrit can contribute to the historiography of the Spanish
American War, and in turn, Part V looks at what the project of studying
PHILIP S. FONER, THE SPANISH-CUBAN AMERICAN WAR AND THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN
IMPERIALISM 1895-1902 2 Vols. (1972); DAVID HEALY, DRIVE To HEGEMONY: THE UNITED
STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN 1898-1917 (1988); DAVID HEALY, US EXPANSIONISM : THE
IMPERIALIST URGE IN THE 1890S (1970); WALTER LAFEBER, THE NEW EMPIRE: AN
INITRPRETATION OF AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1860-1898 (1963); ERNEST R. MAY, IMPERIAL
DEMOCRACY: THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICA AS A GREAT POWER (2d ed. 1991); H. WAYNE
MORGAN, AMERICA'S ROAD To EMPIRE: THE WAR WITH SPAIN AND OVERSEAS EXPANSION (1965);
JOHN L. OFFNER, AN UNWANTIE WAR: THE DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN OVER
CUBA, 1895-1898 113 (1992).
4. See generally JOSt A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: NOTES ON
ThE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO RICANS 7 (1979); JOSt
TRfAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD 3 (1997);
ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (1998);
JUAN TORRUELLA THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND
UNEQUAL (1985); Hon. Jose A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, 100
HARV. L. REV. 450, 455 (1986) (book review); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas & Petra DeWitt, One
Hundred Years of Solitude for the Tropical Peoples of the Insular Territories: Transformations of
National Identity, Race and Citizenship, 1896-1900 (forthcoming); Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico:
Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2000); Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal
Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225
(1996);Ediberto Roman, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism,
26 FL. ST. U L. REV. 1 (1998); Ediberto Romdn, Empire Forgotten: The United States' Colonization
of Puerto Rico, 42 VIlL L. REV. 1119 (1997); Roger Smith, The Bitter Roots of Puerto Rican
Citizenship (forthcoming 2000) ("the Spanish-American War was an unjust, unprovoked, and racist
war of aggression by the United States"); Mark Stuart Weiner, Race Citizenship and Culture in
American Law, 1883- 1954: Ethno-Juridical Discourse from Crow Dog to Brown v. Board of
Education (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale 1998). Tellingly, Alexander Bickel's well-known essay arguing
that the moral justification of democracy is based on the consent of the governed has not a word
about US governance of native Hawaiians, Puerto Rico, Guam and American Samoa, against their
consent. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
5. See infra Parts I & II.
6. It is no accident that colonial studies classics are rooted in the European colonial
experience. See FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF T1E EARTH (1963); ALBERT MEMMI, THE
COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (1957); EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993).
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the Spanish American War can contribute to LatCrit. This enterprise of-
fers the possibility that LatCrit could build better interracial and intereth-
nic coalitions because such historical work could lead to better intellec-
tual empathy for other Latino/a subgroups. But as well, Spanish Ameri-
can War historiography can offer a centering axis to this project of Lat-
Crit.
Finally Part IV applies the same critical lens to LatCrit that the prior
parts of this article applied to American historiography. LatCrit and
Critical Race Theory (CRT), as well, can be said to take a disciplinary
perspective overly preoccupied with race. A balance can be struck if
LatCrit theorists have greater awareness of the perspectives inherent to
the race theoretic efforts and the analysis of American historians.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR
The Spanish American War was the last war of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, and augured the Twentieth Century, which historians call the
American Century. On April 15, 1898, Congress enacted a resolution
declaring it necessary for the United States to intervene in Cuba's second
war of independence against Spain,' which had broken three years ear-
lier.9 Cuba, along with Puerto Rico, were the only colonies remaining of
the old Spanish empire in Latin America.10 From 1808 to 1826, the old
Spanish empire declined as Latin America's desire for nationhood and
self-determination gave rise to the Latin American notions stretching
from Mexico to Chile." Spain, determined not to lose what was left of its
7. Henry Luce originally coined this phrase. See HENRY LUCE, THE AMERICAN CENTURY
(1941); see also IVAN MUSICANT, EMPIRE BY DEFAULT: THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR AND THE
DAWN OF THE AMERICAN CENTURY (1998); DAVID TRAXEL, 1898: THE BIRTH OF THE AMERICAN
CENTURY (1998).
8. See Joint Resolution for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba,
demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the Island of
Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the
President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these
resolutions into effect. J. Res. 24, 55th Cong. (2d Sess.), 30 Stat. 738, 739 (1898). The message sent
by Congress advocated "neutral intervention ... to stop the war" 31 CONG. REC. 3885-91 (Apr. 15,
1898).
9. On February 25, 1895, Juan Gualberto G6mez, leader of the Cuban independence military
forces, began the war in the western provinces of Cuba with the Grito de Baire. In 1897, also in the
west of the island, Pachin Martin called upon Puerto Ricans to commence its war of independence
with the Grito de Yauco. In Puerto Rico, the Spanish were able to quickly quell the rebellion, but in
Cuba, the revolutionary military forces were stronger and more numerous and the Spanish were
unable to defeat the ragtag revolutionaries. Jose Martf, Cuba's revolutionary hero, always envisioned
that Cuba and Puerto Rico would be liberated together from Spanish rule. MUSICANT, supra note 7,
at 48 (1998); FERNANDO PIC6, HISTORIA GENERAL DE PUERTO RICO 218-19 (1988).
10. See generally DAVID BUSHNELL & NEtL MACAULAY, THE EMERGENCE OF LATIN
AMERICA IN THE NINErEENrH CENTURY (2nd ed., 1994). This desire to hold on to the remains of the
Spanish empire loomed large in the events triggering the Spanish American War. Id. at 263-64.
i1. See generally BUSHNELL & MACAULAY, supra note 10 (emphasizing a selective
liberalism as the dominant ideology for the Latin American independence experience); RICHARD
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empire, instituted repressive measures. The Spanish military recognized
that the Cuban revolutionary war was in effect a guerilla war." The revo-
lutionaries hid in the hills and engaged the Spanish only in skirmishes.3
It was also a class war waged mostly by the middle class criollo leaders
and destitute sugar cane and field workers. 14 The Spanish military deter-
mined that the best way to fight the revolutionary force's guerilla tactics
was to "re-concentrate" Spanish farmers and sugar cane field workers,
deemed sympathetic to the guerillas, in garrisons located in major Cuban
cities. 5 This "reconcentrado" program was repressive and cruel, even by
standards of the day, and resulted in rampant starvation and disease. It is
estimated that anywhere from 200,000 to one-half million Cubans died
as a result.
16
Americans were appalled at the Spanish measures. 7 In addition, the
Cuban revolutionaries had waged an effective campaign for their cause
GRAHAM, INDEPENDENCE IN LATIN AMERICA (2nd ed., 1972) ( places the independence movement
of Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the context of the rise of industrial capitalism, rising
democratic idealism, and transformations in social relationships); JOHN LYNCH, THE SPANISH
AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS, 1808-1826 (2d ed.. 1986) (views the revolutionary outbreak as the
culmination of a long process of alienation from Spain and the growing awareness of nationality,
consciousness of culture, and jealousy of own resources).
12. Cuban revolutionaries had fought a resolute and savvy guerilla war, exacting casualties
from the Spaniards, and disappearing when outnumbered them. See FONER, supra note 3, at 35-118;
LOUIS A PEREZ, JR., CUBA BErWEEN EMPIRES, 1878-1902 53-56 (1982) [hereinafter PEREZ, CUBA].
The second Spanish commander, General Valeriano Weyler, sent to quell the Cuban independence
movement in 1896, initiated a strategy of fighting "war with war." OFFNER, supra note 3, at 129.
13. Rural peasants provided cover and material support. It became "a war without a clearly
identifiable enemy." PEREZ, CUBA, supra note 12, at 51; MUSICANT, supra note 7, at 50-66.
14. The Cuban insurrection was made up of mostly landless field workers. See FONER, supra
note 3, at 98-118; PEREZ, CUBA supra note 12, at 53-56. The Spanish depicted the Cuban military
General Maceo, as a "crude, Barbaric, caudillo de negros who delighted in practices forbidden by
the rules of civilized warfare and sought a black republic of Cuba, headed by himself." MUSICANT,
supra note 7, at 66. Maceo managed to outwit the Spanish generals and the superior equipped
Spanish army for more than three and a half years, until the Americans intervened. Id. at 64-67.
15. Weyler's response to the guerilla war was to imprison the mostly agrarian Cuban
population into reconcentrados, the equivalent of concentration camps, where they suffered disease
and starvation. PEREZ, CUBA, supra note 12, at 51; see also FONER, supra note 3, at 77, 110-118,
130-33.
16. Official reports put the number of reconcentrados at 500,000 and estimated that by
December 1897, 200,000 had died, and at least that many were starving. FONER, supra note 3, at
115. Offner quotes a variety of figures: the Cuban revolutionary government headed by Blanco
estimated 300,000 dying or starving; a Boston merchant reported to Congress that the island's total
deaths equaled 500,000. OFFNER, supra note 3, at 111-12. The Hearst papers, carrying headlines
like, "Blood on the Doorsteps," reported that 400,000 to 500,000 Cubans had died. FREIDEL, supra
note 1, at 4.
17. As is widely known, the press played a prominent role in sensationalizing the events
leading to the Spanish American War. The Hearst papers bragged that they had manufactured the
War. See infra note 23. As well, eye witness narratives of the Cuban reconcentrados were an
important catalyst. In particular, Senator Proctor gave a detailed report to the Senate of his unofficial
trip to Cuba, which caused great commotion:
All the country people in the four western provinces, about 400,000 in number.
. [under] Weyler's order . . . were driven into this towns and these are the
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in the press and Congress." Accordingly, there was great sympathy for
their fight for independence. Cuban revolutionaries counted on support in
the U.S. Congress. 9 From the beginning of the reconcertrado program,
U.S. Congressional war hawks attempted to muster the majority neces-
sary to declare war. But President William McKinley, having lived
through the Civil War,20 from the moment of his inauguration, was com-
mitted to a diplomatic resolution."' McKinley applied himself assidu-
ously to preventing war, using his diplomatic skills, experience and
knowledge of Congress to maneuver a compromise.2
However, events overtook McKinley's appeals for temperance. First,
the U.S. press, then with a strong jingoistic bias, 23 reported verbatim the
reconcentrados. They were the peasantry .... It is but fair to say that the normal
condition of these people ... was not high ... but ... satisfactory.... Torn from
their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and food or none, what wonder
that one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they
can not be saved? The physicians say these cases are hopeless . . . the sight of
them makes an appeal stronger than words.
351 CONG. REC. 2916-17 (March 17, 1898).
18. Perez emphasizes that Jose Marti's exile in New York was well spent making the case for
the Cuban independence movement in widely read American newspapers. See PEREZ, CUBA, supra
note 12, at 14-5, 45, 90-1, 94-5.
19. The Cuban independence movement was influential in garnering support in the U.S.
Congress. Senators argued that the revolutionary junta be recognized as the duly constituted
sovereign of the Cuban people prior to U.S. intervention. This was prevented by the McKinley
administration. Historian Perez argues that the McKinley administration opposed this because they
wanted U.S. control over Cuba, and some inside the administration believed that the insurgents were
a motley minority that would not be able to self govern effectively. PEREZ, CUBA, supra note 12, at
166, 170-71, 173.
20. DOBSON, supra note 3, at 19 ("McKinley's own experiences in the Civil War made him
very reluctant to draw the United States into any conflict.").
21. In his first inaugural address, McKinley made the case for diplomacy:
It will be our aim to pursue a firm and dignified foreign policy, which shall be
just, impartial, ever watchful of our national honor, and always insisting upon the
enforcement of the lawful rights of American citizens everywhere. Our diplomacy
should seek nothing more and accept nothing less than is due us. We want no
wars of conquest; we must avoid the temptation of territorial aggression. War
should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed; peace is
preferable to war in almost every contingency. Arbitration is the true method of
settlement of international as well as local or individual differences.
McKinley Inaugural Address, March 1897.
22. Modem historiography gives largely a favorable account of McKinley's efforts. See
LEWIS L. GOULD, THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR AND PRESIDENT MCKIN.EY (1980) (highly
favorable view); MAY, supra note 3 (detailed accounting of the back and forth, depicting events as
overtaking diplomacy); OFFNER, supra note 3 (detailing diplomatic efforts and portraying McKinley
as determined to avoid war). But see MUSICANT, supra note 7, at 178 (McKinley was "paralyzed by
indecision").
23. Hearst was to call the Spanish American war "The New York Journal's war." FREIDEL,
supra note 1, at 5. The Spanish American War was the first war in which newspapers and magazines
were able to publish authentic photographs of war action. See HARPER'S PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE
WAR WITH SPAIN (1899) (also containing explanatory text); JAMES WYMAN, JOSEPH PULITZER AND
HIS WORLD (1941); David Jay Gervich, Leslie's Weekly's Pictorial Coverage of the Spanish
American War (M.A. Thesis , University of Missouri-Columbia, 1970) (surveying Leslie's photo
journalism). Much modem historiography on the Spanish American war has been aimed at rebutting
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indiscreet and disdainful comments of the principal Spanish diplomat
negotiating with McKinley, Dupuy de L6me.2' He ridiculed McKinley
and bragged that the Spanish would eventually get the better of him.
Americans were enraged, McKinley was embarrassed, and de L6me was
recalled during a crucial time in the negotiations. 5 Then, riots broke out
in Havana and American citizens residing there asked the U.S. embassy
for protection from what was depicted as rampant lawlessness. 6 With the
consent of Spain, McKinley sent the U.S.S Maine to Havana0 This ship
mysteriously was sunk barely a few days after arriving, and it gave the
war its motto, "Remember the Maine."25
If the Spanish American War had been limited to these events, this
war would be only an interesting interlude in United States history. It
would exemplify two things. First, as described above, how events can
overtake players committed to a peaceful resolution of conflict. Second,
how a once-powerful nation, Spain, permitted itself to be drawn into an
armed conflict knowing that it might well be "el gran desastre" (the
great disaster).29 Spain was in no position to fight this War, yet pride, the
desire to hold onto the glory of the past, and civic unrest at home drove
Spain into this effort.30 Spain's military arsenal was antiquated, its mili-
the claim that the 1898 war was manufactured by the yellow press, and positing instead that more
complex motivations were at heart. See sources cited supra note 3.
24. Dupuy de Lme, was the key Spanish diplomat. The letter, published in the American
press, reads in part:
Besides the natural and inevitable coarseness with which he repeats all that the
press and public opinion of Spain have said of Weyler, it shows once more that
McKinley is weak and catering to the rabble and, besides, a low politician who
desires to leave a door open to himself and to stand well with the jingoes of his
party. Nevertheless, as a mater of fact it will depend on ourselves whether he will
prove adverse to us.
Dupuy de 16me to Canalejas (undated), reprinted in FONER, supra note 3, at 232-33.
25. FONER, supra note 3, at 232-33; MAY, supra note 3, at 135-37; OFFNER, supra note 3, at
116-19.
26. OFFNER, supra note 3, at 94-100. Offner offers the view that while Madrid believed the
reforms to be working, Washington slowly came to the conclusion that Spain could no longer control
the situation in Cuba. Further, the administration woried that the rioting threatened American lives
and property. Id. at 100; see also DOBSON, supra note 3, at 52.
27. The official purpose of the U.S.S Maine's visit to Havana was a courtesy call. The U.S.
consul had voiced concern over the safety of American residents when the January 1897 riots broke
out in Havana. McKinley appears to have weighed the risks involved in sending a battleship into
such a volatile situation. FREIDEL, supra note 1, at 4; MAY, supra note 3, at 135-37. Offner reports
that DuPuy de Lame saw the stationing of the Maine as a means of appeasing U.S. Congressional
pro-war sentiment. See OFFNER, supra note 3, at 113.
28. The headline of a New York paper read "Maine Explosion Caused by Bomb or Torpedo?
Capt. Sigsbee, in a suppressed dispatch to the State Department says the accident was made possible
by an Enemy." THE WORLD (Feb. 17, 1898) at 1, reprinted in FREIDEL, supra note 1, at 6.
29. See SEBASTIAN BALFOUR, THE END OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE, 1898-1923 11, 12 n.3
(1997).
30. See generally MAY, supra note 3 (asking why did Spain go to war under the
circumstances); MUSICANT, supra note 7 (noting Spanish efforts to avoid war, particularly the
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tary forces stretched thin after centuries of defending an empire that
spanned the globe.3 By contrast, the United States, in spite of being at
the beginning of the recovery of the Nation's second worst depression,
the 1893 bust, had recently expanded and modernized its Navy."
Rather, this War is significant because of its consequences. The
Treaty of Paris of 1898 best crystallizes this. The Treaty signed by Spain
and the United States on December 10, 1898, and approved by the U.S.
Senate in March 17, 1899, 33 took one month longer to negotiate than the
War took to fight.34 The approval of the Treaty was tenaciously fought in
the United States by a coalition of anti-imperialists, Republican tradi-
tionalists and Democrats. 3' The victory in the Senate was in doubt even
on the date of the roll call. The Treaty passed by only two votes cast by
Senators who changed their mind that very day-thanks to McKinley's
arm-twisting.
6
The Treaty was many things at once. First, it was a document ending
the war. As such, it outlined the spoils the United States would claim as
indemnity. From the beginning of the negotiation, the United States de-
Canovas government); OFFNER, supra note 3, at 86-100 (detailing events motivating Spanish
diplomacy).
31. For the view that the War was not as one-sided in favor of the United States as it would
seem, see generally BALFOUR, supra note 29. Spain had about 200,000 soldiers in Cuba and 30,000
in the Philippines, but they often fought at a numerical disadvantage because they were scattered in
small garrisons. See GRAHAM A. COSMAS, AN ARMY FOR EMPIRE: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN
THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 238 (2nd ed., 1994) (1971) (more than 20,000 Spanish soldiers in the
Philippines, 13,000 of them in Manila, versus 12,000 revolucionarios, and 8,000 U.S. troops around
the city). In Santiago de Cuba, the only region on the island invaded by the U.S. Army, 8,000
Spaniards were besieged by up to 20,000 Americans and 4,000 Cuban rebels. Id. at 230. The 8,000
Spanish regulars in Puerto Rico were outnumbered 2-to-I by up to 17,000 U.S. troops. Id. at 234,
236. FONER, supra note 3, at 135, 137 (various historians dispute the number of Spanish troops in
Cuba in early 1898, ranging from a low 70,000 combatants to 278,457 of all classes, including
regulars from Spain and volunteers and irregulars from the island, versus 30,000 rebels).
32. LAFEBER, supra note 3, at 121-27 (describing the funding of $50 million requested by the
McKinley administration for modernizing the US Navy). See generally MAY, supra note 3
(reporting on contemporary commentary that Theodore Roosevelt as US Assistant Secretary of the
Navy had been largely responsible for the winning of the War because of his efforts in modernizing
the Navy).
33. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754 (1898), T.S. No. 343.
34. The Treaty of Paris setting forth the terms of peace was negotiated in Paris from August
12 to December 15, 1898. It took three weeks, from July 26 to August 12, 1898 to negotiate the
protocol for cease fire and peace negotiation. See BRIAN P. DAMIANI, ADVOCATES OF EMPIRE
WILLIAM MCKINLEY, THE SENATE AND AMERICAN EXPANSION, 1898-1899 23-29 (1987); OFFNER,
supra note 3, at 209-23. On the other hand, the War consisted of three major battles fought from
May to July 1898. Roosevelt wrote in private correspondence that he regretted that the War had not
lasted long enough.
35. See generally ROBERT L. BEISNER. TWELVE AGAINST EMPIRE, THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS,
1898-1900 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter BEISNER, ANTI-IMPERIALISTS]; DAMIANI, supra note 34, at
120-202.
36. Henry Cabot Lodge, Ratification of the Treaty, in HARPER'S PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE
WAR WITH SPAIN 430 (1899).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4
clared Puerto Rico its own as a "war indemnity."37 Cuba was not avail-
able since the United States had committed itself to Cuba's independ-
38
ence.
Second, the Treaty was a document of expansion. Under the Treaty,
the United States would become sovereign over territories spanning half
the globe. Spain ceded the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico and trans-
ferred "occupation" of Cuba to the United States.39
Third, this was a political document. McKinley calculated just how
far he could go in breaking with traditional U.S. isolationism, as he and
the US peace commission negotiated the Treaty.40 The peace commis-
sioners were a political coalition, reflecting the conflicting views of the
Senate, and included moderates, isolationists and expansionists.4 ' The
process of negotiation, which included feedback from the commission-
ers, internal Cabinet discussions, negotiations with Congressional lead-
ers, and the citizen feedback McKinley received from his fall speaking
tour in the Midwest influenced his stance on expansionism. 4 Towards
37. "Instructions of the Peace Commissioners," p. 7, Sep. 16, 1898, Reel 85, Series 5,
Messages, William McKinley Papers, Washington: Library of Congress, 1961 [hereinafter WMK].
The stage was set, however, in the negotiation for a peace protocol in which the United States made
that claim, and Spain was forced to accept it. DAMIANI, supra note 34, at 25-29.
38. The Teller Amendment to the Joint Resolution declaring War provided:
[Resolved] [tihat the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention
to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said Island except for the
pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to
leave the government and control of the Island to its people.
J. Res. 24, 55th Cong. (2d Sess.), 30 Stat. 738, 739 (1898).
39. In Article I of the Treaty of Paris, Spain "relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and
title to Cuba." Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, Art. I, 30 Stat. 1754 (1898), T.S. No.343.
According to contemporaneous diplomatic history, Spain insisted on the term "occupation" rather
than "possession." ELBERT J. BENTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH-
AMERICAN WAR (1908).
40. DOBSON, supra note 3, at 108, 110-111 (calling McKinley a "wiley [sic] politician" who
had already adopted "the open door" policy to the Orient as the "administration's guiding
principle").
41. Senators Cushman K. Davis of Michigan and William P. Frye of Maine and New York
Tribune publisher/editor Whitelaw Reid were proclaimed expansionists. Democrat Senator George
Gray of Delaware held well-known isolationist views, and William Rufus Day, the president of the
commission, was a moderate expansionist. See WHrI'ELAW REID, MAKING PEACE WITH SPAIN: THE
DIARY OF WHITELAW REID, SEFTEMBER- DECEMBER 1898 26-27, 239-42 (H. Wayne Morgan, ed.
1965); see also DAMIANI, supra note 34, at 29-32 (McKinley chose the commission "shrewdly" and,
for political reasons, rejected Henry Cabot Lodge's bid to be on the Commission); STUART
CREIGHTON MI.ER, "BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION:" AMERICAN CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES,
1899-1903 20 (1982) (arguing that McKinley chose a "shrewdly balanced commission"); DAVID F.
TRASK, THE WAR WITH SPAIN IN 1898 435-36 (1981) ("[Alt the outset.., the majority... favored
a 'large policy."').
42. DOBSON, supra note 3, at 109, 112 (seeing purpose of the tour to "create the impression
of popular support" and, thus, providing McKinley with confidence in his expansionist policy);
MIRLER, supra note 41, at 14-16 (arguing that McKinley "was a reluctant imperialist," and that his
decisions "had more to do with a shift of popular opinion as reflected in the press that with the
counsel of Lodge or Hay"); TRASK, supra note 41, at 441, 444 (arguing that McKinley took several
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the end of the negotiations, McKinley had determined to aggressively
seek U.S. possession of the Philippines, as well as the smaller Pacific
Islands and Puerto Rico.43
Most importantly, the Treaty redefined the democratic polity and de
jure U.S. citizenship in racial and cultural terms. While the United States
desired to hold on to lands spanning half the globe, no political leader-
neither annexionist nor the anti-imperialist--envisioned that the racially
and culturally foreign peoples who inhabited the ceded nations, Filipinos,
Guamanians, and Puerto Ricans, would one day join the American body
politic as full and equal citizens. At best, some saw a long period of tute-
lage at the end of which these peoples would be ready for democratic
self-governance. 44 This was a radical departure from earlier expansionist
ventures. In the earlier Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, executed at the
conclusion of the U.S.-Mexico War of 1848, Mexican citizens, who had
resided in the ceded territories-now the American Southwest, Califor-
nia, and Colorado--could elect to become American citizens. The Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed that Mexicans who remained on ceded• 45
lands would have full de jure citizenship rights as Americans. By con-
trast, the Treaty of Paris makes no such provision. Instead, the Treaty of
Paris provided that the Spanish citizens of the ceded territories who
elected to remain in the territories following the cession to the United
States would have only such civil rights as Congress would determine. 46
This was a purposeful departure from earlier treaty commitments,7
and it can be understood as the United States' first step to colonialism
"grudging" steps "toward territorial expansion" as he gained more information and also in response
to "the outbursts of popular expansionist sentiment.").,
43. BENTON, supra note 39, at 243 (by late October 1898, "the President had become the
staunchest supporter of territorial expansion"); DAMIANI, supra note 34, at 23-24 (in February 1898,
McKinley was willing to settle War with only Cuba at stake; in May, McKinley stipulated that Spain
could keep the Philippines; by July, McKinley insisted that Spain could not retain the Philippines).
44. This idea was the position of the McKinley colonial administrators. See Elihu Root, The
Principles of Colonial Policy: Port Rico, Cuba and the Philippines, in THE MIUTARY AND
COLONIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES: ADDRESSES AND REPORTS (Robert Bacon & James
Brown Scott eds., 1970) (Report of the Secretary of War for 1899).
45. Art. IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo provides that Mexican citizens who remained
in the ceded territories and did not elect to retain Mexican citizenship "be incorporated into the
Union of the United States, and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged by the congress of the
United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States according to the
principles of the Constitution."
46. The Treaty of Paris, Article IX, provided that the inhabitants of the Philippines, Puerto
Rico and Guam, had only such "civil rights and political status... [as] shall be determined by the
Congress." Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754 (1898), T.S. No. 343.
47. Cf. Abbot Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions -- A Third View, 13 HARV. L. REV.
155, 155-170, 171 (1899) ("All the treaties for the acquisition of territory on the continent of North
America have therefore provided that the people should be incorporated to the Union, or admitted to
the rights of citizens."). Professor Lowell, political science professor, and later president at Harvard,
provides an excellent analysis of this purposeful exclusion of citizenship ights. Because this
departure was purposeful, he argued that the terms Congress intended to be "unincorporated." This
was to be the theoretical basis for the Court's subsequent unincorporated territories doctrine. See
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and empire. While in the case of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Lat-
Crit theorists and American historians have shown that subsequent inter-
pretations of this treaty's citizenship provisions and its implementing
legislation vastly undermined the rights of ex-Mexican citizens," in the
Treaty of Paris, there was no pretense that the United States would grant
citizenship rights and privileges to these foreign peoples equivalent to
those then held by white men.
The choices were well understood by politicians and the public.
There were three possibilities that were proposed and debated. First, as
proposed by the anti-imperialists, the United States could forego annexa-
tion.49 Second, as proposed by various senators, as well as William
Jennings Bryan, McKinley's presidential opponent in the elections of
1896 and 1900, the United States could annex these nations, and pre-
commit to their independence. Third, as provided by the Treaty of Paris,
the United States could annex these nations, and expand its borders.5
However, this path would mean that these foreign peoples were to be
Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution? 100 YALE L. J. 909, 959-60 (1991) (Lowell's "distinction
between two kinds of acquired territories... based on a political decision to make them part of the
United States, would eventually persuade a majority of the Supreme Court").
48. See Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicano/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On The
Edge Of A "Naked Knife," 4 MICK J. RACE & L. 39 (1998); Guadalupe T. Luna, En El Nombre De
Dios Todo-Poderoso: The Treaty Of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Narrativos Legales, 5 SW. J.L. &
TRADE AM. 45 (1998); Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of Race: The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691 (1999).
49. This idea is the "pure" anti-imperialist position. See George S. Boutwell, Isolation and
Imperialism, in THE CRISIS OF THE REPUBLIC (1900) (as President of the Anti-Imperialist League,
setting forth the argument against annexation of these territories); Jim Zwick, Mark Twains'
Opposition to United States Imperialism: A Centennial Perspective' (describing Twain's long time
opposition to annexation and the US-Filipino War); see also WILIJAM JENNINGS BRYAN, BRYAN ON
IMPERIAISM (1900). Jennings Bryan would later change his mind and argue that the Treaty should
be approved, meaning that the United State should first annex the territories and determine their
future later. This last minute change of heart is credited for the Treaty's victory in the Senate. Id at
195-96 (reporting on Bryan's switching positions); see BEISNER, ANTI-IMPERIAISTS, supra note 35,
at 157-58 (opining that Bryan's support for the Treaty must have influenced some of the sixteen
Democrat and pro-silver Senators who voted for ratification); BRANDS, EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 34
(reporting that Republican Senator Hoar called Brian "the most thoroughly guilty man in the United
States of the wrong of this whole Philippine business").
50. This idea came to be the compromise position of the anti-imperialists, particularly George
F. Hoar, a respected Republican Senator from Boston, and Jennings Bryan. Bryan proposed that the
U.S. ratify peace and that, later, Congress make explicit U.S. intent to establish stable governments
in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. Savannah, Georgia Interview Dec. 13, 1898 in BRYAN,
supra note 49, at 5-6. Hoar supported the amendment to the Treaty proposed by Democrat Augustus
Bacon of Georgia that would have provided that the United States would not exercise permanent
control over the Philippines and would provide independence when these islands had "a stable and
independent government." BEISNER, ANTI-IMPERIALISTS, supra note 35, at 151-57.
51. McKinley would argue that only this option was open to the United States, and that the
first and second options were a dereliction of duty, to withdraw would precipitate a "civil war of
endless... slaughter" and "invite foreign intervention." INSTRUCTIONS OF PEACE COMMISSIONERS,
at 5-6, Sept. 16, 1898, Reel 85, Series 5, Messages, WMK.
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relegated to outsider status-neither part of the U.S. polity, nor free to
follow their own national destiny.
Only the first option would have been consistent with the Ameri-
cans' civic democratic traditions and their civic principles. The second
option would not have expressly broken with America's civic commit-
ment to consent of the governed or departed from its anti-colonial tradi-
tions. The United States chose the third option, which broke de jure and
expressly with its prior democratic precedents and civic rhetoric in the
Declaration of Independence that all men possessed an "inalienable
right" to self-rule.52
During the key period of 1899 to 1900, no clear consensus arose on
what path would be appropriate. The United States, nonetheless, em-
barked on a colonialist path, choosing to annex lands and rule over peo-
ples that had not consented to its rule. Filipinos had clearly expressed
their desire for nationhood, and took up arms against the United States
on the eve of the vote on the Treaty of Paris when it became clear that
the United States had no intent of honoring Filipino independence." As
for Puerto Ricans, no plebiscite was ever conducted as to whether Puerto
Rico consented to be governed by the United States. Instead, the United
States relied on Puerto Ricans' acclamation and support of General
Miles's invasion armyi4 That support was precipitated by Miles's prom-
ise to bring to Puerto Ricans "protection, not only to yourselves but to
your property.... prosperity, and... the immunities and blessings of the
52. See BOUTWEI1, supra note 49. In his inaugural speech as President of the Anti-
Imperialist League, Boutwell eloquently set forth this position.
A beaten foe has no right to transfer a people whose consent has not been asked,
and a free republic has no right to hold in subjection a people so transferred....
As solemnly as a people could, we announced the war to be solely for humanity
and freedom, without a thought, desire, or purpose of gain to ourselves; all that
we sought has been accomplished in Cuba's liberation. Shall we now prove false
to our declaration and seize by force islands thousands of miles away whose
peoples have not desired our presence and whose will we have not asked?
Whatever islands we take must be annexed or held in vassalage to the Republic.
Either course is dangerous....
Id. Beisner calls "conservatism" this attention to core civic values and contends that although many
anti-imperialists held racist views and feared racial "mixing," it is this civic concern that lies at the
core of the anti-imperialist movement. See BEISNER, ANTI-LMPERIAU5, supra note 35, at 237-38.
53. The Philippine-American war commenced on February 4, 1899 as Aguinaldo, the leader
of the revolutionary forces, asserted that he had done "everything possible to avoid armed conflict,
in the hope of securing our independence through peaceful means ....... Did McKinley or
expansionists manipulate its outbreak? No evidence seems to be available. Clearly the timing is
auspicious since some Senators felt more compelled to vote for the Treaty once the United States
was at war. See BRANDS, EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 49; MILLER, supra note 41, at 57.
54. See BENTON, supra note 39, at 243 (no plebiscite necessary because Puerto Ricans had
welcomed Miles's forces). Damiani reports that Spain knew of Puerto Ricans' support for the U.S.
military invasion and that this fact dissuaded the Spanish negotiators from insisting that Puerto Rico
not be a war indemnity. See DAMIANI, supra note 34, at 22-25.
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liberal institution of our government."55 The revolutionary movement
was split over the wisdom of aligning Puerto Rico's nationalist's ambi-
tions with the United States.6 Some desired to remain part of Spain un-
der the Autonomous Charter of 1898, which gave Puerto Rico greater
rights of self determination and representation. While others, like jour-
nalist Luis Mufioz Rivera, who would eventually create the party sup-
porting the current Commonwealth status, saw the path to eventual inde-
pendence in an association with the United States.
58
The Spanish American War also triggered the annexation of Hawaii.
In July 1898, as the War was being fought, the United States annexed the
newly formed Republic of Hawaii," a state formed by the coup d'etat of
White planters against the traditional monarchy of the Hawaiian King-
dom.'° Only five years earlier, President Grover Cleveland had with-
55. General Miles invaded Puerto Rico on July 25, 1898. Miles declared when he landed in
Puerto Rico:
We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has
been oppressed, but on the contrary to bring you protection, not only to
yourselves but to your property, to promote your prosperity, and to bestow upon
you the immunities and blessing of the liberal institution of our government ....
This is not a war of devastation but one to vie all to within the control of its
military and naval forces the advantages and blessing of enlightened civilization.
We come bearing the banner of freedom ...the fostering arm of a nation of free
people, whose greatest power is in justice and humanity for all those living within
its fold.
Proclamation by General Nelson A. Miles to the People of Puerto Rico, quoted in 144 CONG. REC.
59041 (1998) (remarks Sen. Bob Graham, D-H); see also ARTURO MORALES CARRION, PUERTO
RiCO: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 132 (1983) (calls this declaration "psychological
warfare");.
56. Autonomists were fragmented between a vision of an independent country and affiliation
with Spain with local home rule, and all variations in between these two models. See PIC, supra
note 9, at 216-19.
57. The Autonomous Charter covering Cuba and Puerto Rico was signed on November 19,
1898, and granted Puerto Rico representation in the Spanish parliament. The Puerto Rico junta had
actively negotiated with Spain. Consequently, the Autonomous charter was viewed as a good result
in Puerto Rico since it provided rights of citizenship equivalent to those of other Spanish citizens.
See CARRION, supra note 55, at 133-35; JOSt TRIAS MONGE, I HISTORIA CONSITIUIONAL DE
PUERTO RICO (1980); MUSICANT, supra note 7, at 169.
58. See CARRION, supra note 55, at 207; PIC0, supra note 9, at 216-17. Luis Mufioz Rivera,
as a nonvoting Resident Commissioner to Congress, would later, in 1917, oppose the Jones Act
granting U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans, asking that this "mass naturalization project" be
postponed for several years. Congress passed the bill over his objection and without a plebiscite.
MONGE, supra note 4, at 73.
59. Annexation was effectuated by a joint resolution adopted by Congress on July 7, 1898,
known as the Newlands Resolution. Resolution No. 55, Newlands Resolution, July 7, 1898, 30 Stat.
750.
60. In 1893, White planters organized an armed overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, then
headed by Queen Lili'uokalani, in which the military assistance offered the U.S. Minister of Foreign
Affairs, John L. Stevens, was instrumental. On July 17, 1893, those who orchestrated the overthrow
formed the Provisional Government and organized the Republic of Hawaii with Robert Dole, an
American planter, as President. President Grover Cleveland rejected this government's bid for
annexation to the United States, pointing to the lawlessness of the actions of both John Stevens and
the American planters. Ernest May writes that Cleveland was not opposed to the annexation of
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drawn a treaty of annexation because he believed that "the overthrow,"
"revolt" and other "remarkable features of the transaction" should be
strongly condemned.6' Nevertheless, McKinley's Republican platform
called for annexation, but the treaty stalled in the Senate.62 With the
Spanish American War, McKinley lobbied for annexation as necessary
for the war effort.
As a result of these events, the United States became master of half
the globe, acquiring sovereignty over the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, and Cuba and subjecting to its control more than nine mil-
lion dark skinned peoples of other cultures and races-Malays, Hawai-
ians, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans.63 In addition, the United States ousted
the last significant European presence from the American hemisphere
three quarters of a century after the declaration of the Monroe doctrine.
II. SPANISH AMERICAN WAR LIVES ON
The repercussions of this "Splendid Little War" continue to influence
the development of countries which were and are ruled under American
style colonialism, and U.S. foreign relations with Latin American and
Pacific countries, have been forever altered due to the influence of this
war.
A. Puerto Rico and Guam.
Currently, Puerto Rico and Guam continue to be de jure US territo-
ries, existing civically outside the U.S. body politic as "unincorporated
territories." This term, which seems to be an oxymoron, was invented by
the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of opinions known as the Insular
Hawaii on expansionist grounds, but morally opposed the actions of the planters. See MAY, supra
note 3, at 20-23, 267 (2nd ed. 1991). See generally THOMAS J. OSBORNE, EMPIRE CAN WAIT:
AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO HAWAIIAN ANNEXATION, 1893-1898 (1981).
61. The President's message declared that "the overthrow" and "revolt" that had "dethroned"
the monarchy, and other "remarkable features of the transaction" made it his "duty ... to withdraw
the treaty of annexation" from consideration by the Senate. See President's Message To Congress
Relating to the Hawaiian Islands (Pres. Grover Cleveland). House Exec. Doc. No. 47, 2d Sess., 53d
Cong., 1893-94 at iii-xvi.
62. While McKinley was in office in June 17, 1897, the United States signed a treaty of
annexation with the planter-controlled Hawaii Republic, while Queen Lili'uokalani was under house
arrest. McKinley submitted the treaty to the Senate, where prolonged debate stalled passage. Only
after the Spanish American developed did the logjam break and Congress annexed Hawaii because
of its "military importance." See LAFEBER, supra note 3, at 366-70.
63. THE TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS AND
DERIVATIVE TABLE 20 (1906) (reports the following population counts: Philippine Islands
7,635,426; Puerto Rico 953,243; and Guam 9,000); ROBERT C. SCHMITT, DEMOGRAPHIC
STATISTICS OF HAWAII, 1778-1965 12, 74-5 (1968) (the Hawaiian 1896 census reported a population
of 109,020 of which 39,504 were full or part Hawaiian, 19,382 Chinese, and 22,329 Japanese); U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CUBA: POPULATION, HISTORY AND RESOURcES, 1907 132, 143 (1909)
(the 1899 Cuban census reported a population of 1,572,797 of which 505,443 were categorized as
"colored").
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Cases,6' the first decided three years following the Spanish American
War. In the Insular Cases, the Court attempted to define the status of the
insular territories as political jurisdictions co-existing within the federal
union. To be an "unincorporated territory," the Court declared, was to be
"subject to U.S. sovereignty," but at the same time, be "foreign in a do-
mestic sense. '
The repercussions of this ruling are great.66 As prominent Puerto Ri-
can jurists and LatCrit theorists, Ediberto Roman, Efren Rivera Ramos,
Pedro Malavet, and Carlos Venator Santiago have argued, this de jure
location outside the polity accounts for these citizens' second-class,
"subordinated" citizenship.67 From the perspective of representative de-
mocracy, de jure standing as outsiders means that Puerto Ricans, Samo-
ans, and Guamanians are not entitled to representation in Congress.68
64. The Insular Cases consist of De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United
States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United
States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hulls v. New York and Porto
Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); and The
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901). Some authors group the decisions decided
between 1903 and 1914 as well. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Gonzalez v.
Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Mendezona v. United States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904); Rassmussen v. United
States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); Grafton v. United States,
206 U.S. 333 (1907); Kent v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907); Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468
(1909); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139 (1913);
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914). Finally, Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922),
not decided until after the Jones Act was passed and Puerto Ricans were granted U.S. citizenship, is
also to some analysts part of the Insular Cases.
65. Downes, 182 U.S. at 341-342 (White, J., concurring) (a territory is not foreign to the
United States in an international sense but is foreign in a domestic sense). The White concurrence
was adopted by the Court in Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), and Balzac v. Porto Rico,
258 U.S. 298 (1922).
66. For critique of the Insular Cases, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the
Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENr. 15, 22 (1994) (current
jurisprudence based on Insular Cases is "startling and troubling"); TORRUELLA, supra note 4, at 3, 5
(doctrine of incorporation, the doctrine of "separate and unequal" and "anacronistic remnants of the
stone age of American constitutional law" that are comparable with "Plessy v. Ferguson in
permitting disparate treatment of a discrete group of citizens."); MONGE, supra note 4 (the Court
erred by not following the elder Justice Harlan's lead); Neuman, supra note 47, at 979 (1991) ("No
persuasive normative basis for the Insular Cases has been put forward"); Ramos, supra note 4
(Insular Cases demonstrate ideological and racial bias); Romd.n, Alien-Citizen Paradox, supra note
4, at 23 (doctrine of incorporation is "morally illegitimate constitutional principle").
67. See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
68. This applies as well to the other U.S. territories, the U.S. Virgin Islands and the other U.S.
Commonwealth, American Samoa. See generally ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS 140-55
(1989). Congress has granted Puerto Rico increasing degrees of local rule but never allowed for
representation at the federal level, authorizing instead only a nonvoting resident delegate in the
House of Representatives. Initially, Puerto Rico was governed as a colony, under the Foraker Act,
under which Puerto Rico was ruled by a Governor appointed by the President of the United States,
and the Governor had the power to veto legislation adopted by the local legislature and to appoint
judges. Foraker Act, ch. 191, §§ 17, 31, 33, 31 Stat. 77, 81, 83-84 (1900) (repealed 1917). The 1917
Jones Act extended U.S. citizenship to residents of Puerto Rico and provided for local election of
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Neither do they vote in the election of the President.6 Rather, as "unin-
corporated territories," the insular territories are subject to the plenary
power of Congress, as well as exempt from the protections of the Uni-
formity Clause which requires that all states be treated the same7l This
has two repercussions. First, U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico and
Guam are entitled to only those social benefits that Congress deems ade-
quate, which may be less or more than benefits given to citizens of other
states.7' Thus, citizens of Puerto Rico, Guam, and Samoa always have
received less in food stamps, welfare, and social security, and the4Trotec-
tions of the Federal minimum wage have also been restricted. Also,
because the Uniformity Clause does not apply, these territories have been
subject to special customs and tariff treatment." With few exceptions this
singular treatment has reflected the interests of the states, which are rep-
resented in Congress, rather than those of the insular territories.74
both houses of the legislature. Puerto Rico Organic Act of 1917 (Jones Act), Pub. L. No. 64-368, §
36, 39 Stat. 951, 963 (1917). In 1950, Congress enacted Public Law 600, "in the nature of a compact
so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own
adoption." PL 600 is the foundation of the current Commonwealth status, and permits Puerto Rico to
have a local Constitution, subject to veto by the U.S. Congress, and to elect its Governor. Act of July
3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319, 319 (1950).
69. The Puerto Rican government litigated this issue in federal court and lost. De la Rosa v.
United States, 107 F. Supp.2d 140 (D.P.R. 2000), rev'd and vacated by 229 F.3d 80 (2000). See also
Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1994) (challenging the Uniformed and
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1 et seq., under which a Puerto Rican
citizen who moves to a state, registers to vote, and then moves to a foreign country can continue to
vote for president where she was last domiciled but not if she returns to Puerto Rico); Attorney Gen.
of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that American citizens living in
Guam cannot vote for the President).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Uniformity Clause provides that "all duties, imposts,
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." I. The territorial clause provides that
Congress shall have the power to make "all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory.
belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
71. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 278-79 (1901) (concluding that because territories are
not constitutional equivalents to states, they are subject to greater congressional control); The
Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176, 181-82 (1901) (construing broadly the Territorial Clause of the
Constitution and refusing to limit Congress's legislative power over the American territories).
72. See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (per curiam) (rejecting constitutional
challenge to Congress's decision to offer lower level of assistance in federal public benefit program
to Puerto Rico than that offered states); Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam)
(upholding requirement that federal disability benefits are payable only to residents over the fifty
states and the District of Columbia).
73. See Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 235-36 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rico
became part of the United States for purposes of tariffs); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243,
244 (1901) (holding that tariff duties on goods imported from Puerto Rico were proper prior to
cession by treaty); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392, 397 (1901) (holding that
steamship trade between New York and Puerto Rico came under U.S. trade laws).
74. For example, under the Jones Act, Puerto Rico must use U.S. marine transport. While in
the 1900s, the U.S. was competitive in prices charged, in current markets U.S. transport is
inordinately costly. The imposition of this requirement works to a great disadvantage to Puerto Rico
manufacturers, who have argued that the Jones Act makes Puerto Rico non-competitive.
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Second, U.S. citizenship of those born in the territories is something
less than the citizenship of those born in the states. A 1997 House Report
took the novel, but reasoned, position that the U.S. citizenship of those
born in unincorporated territories can be revoked by Congress at any
time because it is a "statutory citizenship" and subject to the will of Con-
gress.7" Supreme Court case law has been highly deferential to Congres-
sional exercises of plenary power under the territorial clause.76 Thus, the
position taken by the House Report, although at present no other branch
of government has followed it, could very well become the official view
of the U.S. government in the future.
Finally, under the Insular Cases, the constitutional protections of
residents of Puerto Rico, Guam and Samoa are subject to ad hoc con-
structions by the judiciary. Under the Insular Cases, the U.S. Constitu-
tion applies to unincorporated territories; however, insular citizens are
entitled to only those rights that U.S. courts deem to be "fundamental."
7
Although the Court in modem times has determined that these "funda-
mental" rights are largely coterminous with constitutional rights under
71the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, this doctrine supports potential
carve outs of basic constitutional rights on the basis of insular territorial
residence anytime a majority of the Court would so determine.
B. Hawaii.
The annexation of Hawaii denied native Hawaiians their right to self-
determination. As Rice v. Cayetano"9 illustrates, the United States consti-
tutional system, as interpreted by the Rehnquist Court, does not accom-
modate group rights of peoples whose country was effectively "stolen."
75. H.R. REP. 105-131, pt. 1, at 13- 14 (Under the Jones Act, Congress extended statutory
United States citizenship to residents of Puerto Rico, but less than equal civil rights. "mhe current
United States citizenship of persons born in Puerto Rico is created and defined by Congress in the
exercise of its Territorial Clause power and in implementation of Article IX of the Treaty of Paris.").
76. See, e.g., Harris, 446 U.S. at 651 (holding that Congress may reimburse less to Puerto
Rico for Aid to Families with Dependent Children than to the states, and may treat Puerto Rico
differently from states so long as there is a rational basis for discrimination). Professor Aleinikoff
criticizes the Court's one page and a half per curiam decision issued without full briefing or oral
argument and its rational basis "review." "The Court is surely correct that residents of Puerto Rico
pay no federal income tax and that funding Puerto Rico at the level of the states would cost the
federal treasury more. [However,] the arguments supplied in support of the statute are rational by not
being crazy." Aleinikoff, supra note 66, at 22-23.
77. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904). This latter rule held whether or not the
territorial population had been granted U.S. citizenship. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 308-10
(1922).
78. See, e.g., Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979) (Fourth Amendment search and
seizure); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (First Amendment,
commercial speech); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982) (voting rights);
Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects, & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 599-601 (1976)
(equal protection); Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1029 (1992) (right of
association).
79. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
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Consequently, native Hawaiians, Hawaiians, and Congress are struggling
to fit this "square peg " (native Hawaiian self- determination) into a
round hole (the Federal system). Making complete restitution to native
Hawaiians would turn modern Hawaii upside down. New economics
would rule. Property rights to the most expensive and desirable resort
properties would revert back to native Hawaiians. New laws, particularly
land use rules, would have to be reconceived. Yet for most Hawaiians,
the continuing disenfranchisement and neglect of native Hawaiians
should be resolved.80
C. The Philippines.
Filipinos' aspirations towards self-government would not be honored
either by the Treaty of Paris or the United States' subsequent colonial
administration of the Philippines." The U.S.-Filipino war, which broke
out on the eve of the approval of the Treaty of Paris, was bloody and
cruel and would eventually be recorded as among the most brutal and
ruthless wars that the United States has ever waged."
The American colonial rule would extend past World War 11.83 Fili-
pinos were never U.S. citizens but instead were U.S. "nationals," clearly
existing outside the polity in a state of tutelage towards their independ-
ence.' However, U.S. tutelage failed to result in a self-sustaining econ-
omy and healthy civic governance. Instead, U.S. colonial administration
formed the foundation for hierarchical local governance. Anglo-
assimilated elites and American expatriates ruled in colonial governance,
and economic decision making tended to benefit American companies'
interests, not the lower classes who needed to rely on a strong local econ-
omy.8 For some, this legacy accounts for the Marcos dictatorship,
today's ongoing guerrilla warfare, and the diaspora of Filipino workers
who emigrate to find adequate work. 6
80. See generally Hawai'i Poll: Ka Huliau Time of Change, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May
28-June 2, 2000; June 4, 2000 (series based on poll data and interviews of native Hawaiians' views
on self determination movement post Rice v. Cayetano), available at
http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/specials/hawaiipol/.
81. See MI.ER, supra note 41, at 268; BRANDS, EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 51.
82. For passionate accountings by Americans, see BRANDS, EMPIRE, supra note 3; STANLEY
KARNOW, IN OUR IMAGE: AMERICA'S EMPIRE IN THE PHtLtPPINES 79 (1989); MIL..ER, supra note
41.
83. The Philippines gained official independence on July 4, 1946. BRANDS, EMPIRE, supra
note 3, at 227. He calls it the "transition from formal to informal imperialism." id. at 353.
84. See generally JAMES D. SOBREDO, FROM AMERICAN "NATIONALS" TO THE "THIRD
ASIATIC INVASION": RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND FILtPINO EXCLUSION (1989-1934) (Ph.D.
dissertation, Berkeley 1998).
85. This is Brand's main argument. See BRANDS, EMPIRE, supra note 3, at 345-46; see also
MILLER, supra note 41, at 263-65, 269.
86. See E. SAN JUAN, JR., FROM EXILE TO DIASPORA (1998); BRANDS, EMPIRE, supra note 3,
at 347, 353-54.
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D. Cuba.
As established by the Treaty of Paris, from 1898 until 1934, Cuba
was under U.S. "tutelage"-neither independent nor a colony, but in
transition towards independence. Under U.S. tutelage, instead of leading
to a robust democratic tradition and a self-sustainin economy, Cuba
became what some have called a "dependent nation." As in the case of
the Philippines, American tutelage and American style capitalism fos-
tered lopsided distributions of wealth, creating a millionaire class who
owned sugar plantations and rum manufacturing, while a worker class
suffered under the back breaking work of sugar cultivation.8 Today, eco-
nomically, Cuba continues to be a single crop economy, and its current
economic woes can be traced to this dependency. 9 Civically, Cuba be-
came a dependent nation under the Platt Amendment,90 which condi-
tioned Cuban independence because the U.S. reserved to itself the right
of intervention if contrary to U.S. interest.9' But U.S. influence in Cuba's
internal affairs has been more far reaching than anything the Platt
Amendment could have wrought. After Cuban independence, the U.S.
supported the Batista dictatorship, reasoning that his governance was
stable and not contrary to U.S. interests which included U.S. capital,
mainly U.S. sugar.92 Many argue that the Spanish American War, since it
led to U.S. foreign policy that supported the excesses of the Batista re-
gime, including his neglect of Cuban workers' welfare, was the neces-
sary precursor to the Castro revolution.9
87. JULES R. BENJAMIN, THE UNrED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION
61 (1990) [hereinafter BENJAMIN, REVOLUTION] (noting that Cuba was neither independent nor
under colonial rule, but under "tutelage"). See generally JULES ROBERT BENJAMIN, THE UNITED
STATES AND CUBA: HEGEMONY AND DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT, 1880-1934 (1974) [hereinafter
BENJAMIN, HEGEMONY] (arguing that hegemonic relationship between United States and Cuba was
self-perpetuating).
88. BENJAMIN, HEGEMONY, supra note 87, at 52, 57, 183-4; BENJAMIN, REVOLUTION, supra
note 87, at 52-91. The Baccardi family, owners of Baccardi, manufacturers of rum, is an example of
this millionaire class.
89. BENJAMIN, HEGEMONY, supra note 87, at 187-8.
90. 21 Stat. 897-98. The Platt Amendment gave the U.S. the right to intervene as it wished to
protect Cuba's independence and to limit the Cuban debt.
91. The United States invoked the Platt Amendment on several occasions to mold Cuban
society, limit the power of radicals, and to preserve stability. BENJAMIN, HEGEMONY, supra note 87,
at 141-42, 149.
92. BENJAMIN, REVOLUTION, supra note 87, at 95, 121 (Washington had confidence in
Batista because "he had eliminated the radical nationalist and revolutionary socialist threats of the
early 1930s[,] . . . had restored coveted stability to the island," and assured "that United States
interests would be respected").
93. BENJAMIN, REVOLUTION, supra note 87, at 128-132; Louis A. Perez Jr., Incurring A Debt




E. U.S. Foreign Relations in Latin America.
In addition, Robert Beisner, David Healy, and Michael Hunt have
argued that the United States foreign policy in Latin America has been
heavily influenced by the U.S.-Spanish War.94 It has encouraged the
United States to look at Latin American sovereignty as subject to what
the United States deems to be in its best interests. Thus, the United States
has intervened, sometimes recklessly, in the internal democratic govern-
ance of these countries. 95
III. HISTORY AND LATCRIT ENTERPRISE
Clearly, the Spanish American War is highly relevant to the LatCrit
enterprise. This relevance is not simply limited to current effects de-
scribed in Part I, but as well the detailed study of history can yield im-
portant insights into how race operates in society and law.
A LatCrit and CRT theorist has at her disposal an analytical arsenal
that includes how race operates as a psychological framework (cogni-
tive), 96 how privileged knowledges and the practices of institutions can
marginalize minorities' ways of knowing and being (structural and post-
structural), 97 how ideology "normalizes" racial attitudes (sociology and
cultural studies),9' and how race becomes a mode of class stratification
and class conflict (Marxist or Neo-Marxist analysis). 99 As the contribu-
94. BEISNER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 3, at 137; HEALY, supra note 3, at 248; MICHAEL
HUNT, IDEOLOGY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 131-32 (1987).
95. HUNT, supra note 94, at 166-67 (continuing the practices of "pretensions to dominance
and tutelage" and justifying counter revolutionary practices as necessary to maintain "desired
stability in Latin America").
96. See, e.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAiF. L. REV. 733 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence II, The d, the Ego and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
97. See, e.g., KimberId Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1357-58
(1988); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law:
A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); George A. Martfnez,
Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience, 1930-
1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555 (1994).
98. The corpus of my work falls in this category. See, e.g., Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas,
Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L.
REV. 150, 160-183 (1999) [hereinafter Democracy & Inclusion]; Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas,
Deconstructing Homo[geneous] Americanus: The White Ethnic Narrative and Its Exclusionary
Effect, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1493, 1546-54 (1998); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of
Initiatives and Referendums in which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60
OHIO ST. L. J. 399, 462-73 (1999); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot" or "Ring
of Fire"?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL L. REV. 1259 (1997).
99. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOr SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST F)R RACIAL
JUSTICE (1987); RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? (1996); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD
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tions to this LatCrit Symposium demonstrate, in LatCrit, as is true of
CRT, no single theoretical framework dominates or preempts. Rather, the
many approaches that theorists apply to analyze race co-exist and com-
plement each "other."
The analysis of history is another valuable approach to the study of
race. As the recent Race and Races casebook by Professors Juan Perea,
Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, and Stephanie Wildman explains, his-
tory can be "essential in understanding the situations faced by [minority]
groups today."'' ° As this and other projects show,01 history describes the
evolution of a racial group's standing in American society today-how it
came to be that a particular group did not successfully "melt" into the
melting pot that is American culture today and remained distinctly a ra-
cial other.
As well, history is an important tool in retrieving, critiquing, and
understanding law. Law is a backward looking discipline because legal
rules are anchored to precedent. The legal process disciplines lawyers by
demanding that they amply justify any departures from past rules't 2 By
looking at history, lawyers can better understand the origin of rules and
determine whether precedent should continue to be followed. Rules can
lose their "common sense;" their origins may be long forgotten and re-
flect values and attitudes that are very different from those which are part
of the present.'l° Archival recovery of legal rules' origins is important to
CRT and LatCrit theorists, because much of this critique is centered in
uncovering the racial origins of precedent, and making present day ar-
guments as to why these rules should be changed.'4
WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S To THE 1990S (2d ed.
1994).
100. See PEREA, RACE AND RACES, supra note 2, at 2. This casebook devotes one-third of its
enterprise to the exploration of the history of the major racial and ethnic minority groups in the
United States.
101. Guadalupe Luna's work on the U.S.-Mexico War is a prime example of other historical
LatCrit projects. See supra note 48.
102. See Owen Fiss, The Death of Law?. 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1986) ("[W]hat I see is
not the unconstrained power of the justices to give vent to their desires and interests, but rather
public officials situated within a profession, bounded at every turn by the norms and conventions
that define and constitute that profession. There is more to judging than simply confronting the bare
words of the fourteenth amendment ... ").
103. This is both a concern of traditional scholars and those with a "crit" bent. For example,
the critique of the Insular Cases by Judge Torruella and Professors Aleinikoff and Neuman focuses
on the inconsistencies of the Court's reasoning and the "thin" rationales. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text. By contrast, Perea, Rivera Ramos and Roman argue that these cases should be
overturned because they are based on racial attitudes accepted in the past but no longer sustainable.
See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
104. Constitutional scholars and jurists debate whether the Constitution should be interpreted
by only referring to the four corners of this text, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (1997), or whether they should refer to norms derived from the US Constitution
940 [Vol. 78:4
HISTORY, LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
For example, former Chief Justice of the Puerto Rico Supreme
Court, Jose Trfas Monge, as well as Circuit Judges Juan Torruella and
Jos6 Cabranes have forcefully critiqued the doctrines that construct
Puerto Rico's de jure second-class citizenship.' e Professor Efren Rivera
Ramos adds to the literature by carefully tracing the influence of ideol-
ogy of expansionism and Anglocentrism in the development of the Insu-
lar Cases.'°6 Professor Ediberto Roman's work links the second class
citizenship status of Puerto Rico over the last one hundred years to racial
and Anglocentric views.'O He attributes "Congress's nativist and
xenophobic fears" and "historical obsession with remaining Anglo and
with social Darwinism" as central to the development, through legislation
and case law, of Puerto Rico's present de jure second class status.' e
Professor Juan Perea argues that racial views toward dark skinned, non
Anglo Saxon races were a key component in the "racial conquest" of the
Southwest under the US-Mexico War of 1848 and the Spanish American
War.'0 9 Professor Perea helps the reader focus on how racial ideas have
had a key role in America's geographical expansion and how law and
legal instruments, such as the Treaty of Paris and the Insular Cases, le-
gitimized this "racial conquest."
'' 0
These works make important contributions because they establish
how racial attitudes impacted upon past precedent and how they continue
to affect current policies and laws. Subsequent formalist applications of
precedent create as, Efren Rivera Ramos notes, a socio-historical reality
that legitimizes, reifies and sustains Puerto Rico's outsider status."' As-
and general democratic principles. See THOMAS GREY, DO WE HAVE AN UNWRrTIEN
CONs9'mlmON? (1975); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
105. The books written by these jurists are significant contributions. See CABRANES, supra
note 4 (analyzing the legislative and judicial processes that accorded Puerto Ricans' second class
citizenship and relating to how racial attitudes and cultural Anglocentrism impacted these decisions);
MONGE, supra note 4 (long time supporter of Commonwealth status critiquing both doctrine and the
politics of Commonwealth status); TORRUELIA, supra note 4 (surveying the development of
"separate and unequal" unincorporated territories doctrine).
106. Rivera Ramos calls this the "ideology of expansion":
The discourse of the Insular Cases incorporated many of the notions that
constituted what I have termed the "ideology of expansion". First of all, it was
overtly racist. . . . [Second,] is the notion that the peoples of the new territories
were incapable of self-government. Moreover, that they were not fit to become
full-fledged members of the American polity, with a right to participate in its
government.
Ramos, supra note 4, at 288-90.
107. Roman, Alien-Citizen Paradox, supra note 4; Roman, Empire, supra note 4.
108. Roman, Alien-Citizen Paradox, supra note 4, at 32.
109. Perea, supra note 2, at 15-19.
110. Id.
Ill. Professors Perea, Roman, and Ramos make this important point. See Perea, supra note 2,
at 15-19; Roman, Alien-Citizen Paradox, supra note 4, at 18. Ramos explains:
Creating a subject involves a process of reification: that is, constructing a
category that acquires the quality of an object. . . The particularities of the
realities which the category is intended to represent fade away as they are
subsumed in the universal quality of the category. In a sense, the particular
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sociate Dean Kevin Johnson notes that work focusing on Puerto Rican's
racialization experiences, both current and historical, is a much needed
component of the LatCrit enterprise."
2
IV. WHAT LATCRIT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE
SPANISH AMERICAN WAR
LatCrit's overall project of taking a "stance against subordination"" 3
contains a historical component. For postcolonial theorist Gayatri
Spivak, a commitment to anti-subordination involves recovering "si-
lenced" historical narratives, "not to recover a lost consciousness, but to
see.., our view of history [which] is a very different view.... [W]e see
the way in which narratives compete with each other, which one rises,
which one falls, who is silent, and the itinerary of the silencing rather
than the retrieval."
' 4
As discussed in Part II, the Spanish-American War continues to have
a great impact on the peoples of the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, Puerto
Rico and Cuba. Yet, American historiography has not paid enough atten-
tion to how the Spanish American War altered the nationalist trajectory
of Puerto Ricans, native Hawaiians, Guamanians, and Filipinos and in-
stead, recast them into subordinated civic positions. LatCrit's predisposi-
tion to look at historical events from an anti-subordination lens means
that LatCrit scholars intuitively bring to this enterprise skepticism and an
outsider's perspective. LatCrit theorists' initial instinct is to ask those
very questions that American historians have not asked with sufficient
frequency and to look at those sources, for example, the archives of the
"losers," that American historians may not have sufficiently used.
A LatCrit theorist would ask the hard questions that probe into how
the dynamics of race and subordination affected the established events of
the Spanish American War. Why did the United States not recognize the
Cuban and Filipino revolutionary governments from the inception of the
Spanish American War-a war fought purportedly to support democracy
in Cuba? How did the McKinley administration get away with this po-
litically, when prior to the War, the Cuban independence movement had
realities exist no more. . . . In this case, the "reality" created was that of the
"unincorporated territory." It did not have any existence before the cases were
decided. But the authoritative pronouncement of the Court brought it into
existence ....
Ramos, supra note 4, at 304.
112. Kevin R. Johnson, Puerto Rico, Puerto Ricans, and LatCrit Theory: Commonalties and
Differences Between Latinola Experiences, 6 MIC. J. RACE & L. _ (2000).
113. See Francisco Valdds, LatCrit: A Conceptual Overview, excerpted from FRANCISCO
VALDES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: HISTORIES, CROSSROADS, DIRECIONS (manuscript on file with
the author).
114. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC: INTERVIEWS,
STRATEGIES, DIAIOGUES 31-32 (1990).
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enjoyed wide support in Congress? Why did the U.S. forces invade
Puerto Rico at a moment when the Spanish American War was practi-
cally won and when the Congressional declaration of war clearly stated
that the U.S. was intervening on behalf of Cuban independence fighters?
Why did the Treaty of Paris-a document negotiated for a longer period
than the war was fought-not provide for full citizenship rights of the
people of the conquered territories? Such questions examine the Spanish
American War with a latter day 20/20 understanding of how these events
have shaped the subordinated status, both de jure and culturally, of racial
minorities.
LatCrit theorists have begun to answer these questions. For exam-
ple, Carlos Venator Santiago analyzes the construction of Puerto Rican
"race" through the civic de jure regimes imposed by the United States in
the early stages of colonial administration, as well as under Puerto Rico's
local legislative acts." 5 He asks how did the Forakker Act, Jones Act, and
local legislative enactments from 1900 to 1917 construct race for Puerto
Ricans, and how, in turn, did these concepts of race affect de jure con-
structions of citizenship." 6 In the longer work on which this essay is
based, my co-author and I assess to what extent racial attitudes impact
the key decisions made during the Spanish American War and attempt to
answer some of the questions posed above. 7 We also focus on legal ac-
tions and the role that these played in fixing a de jure second class racial
citizenship in what had been a closely disputed and deeply divisive civic
debate." 8
Work such as this revisits historical events and reinterprets historical
documents. Some might argue that this work is repetitive, echoing Louis
P6rez's historiographical critique,"9 because in effect, such research goes
over ground already covered previously by American historians. How-
ever, LatCrit work examines the historical evidence from a different in-
terpretive pose, focusing on the historical development of racial forma-
tion and racial and cultural subordination. This is a new effort, which is
being paralleled within American historical research.. and by Puerto
Rican jurists and researchers,' traces the development of and transitions
in national identity, culture, and race. Although work has begun, much
remains to be done. Thus, LatCrit theorists could contribute "a great
deal" to this effect
115. See Venator Santiago, supra note 2.
116. Id
117. See Lazos & Dewitt, supra note 4.
118. Id
119. See Perez, supra note 12.
120. See infra notes 135, 137, 140-41.
121. See supra note 105.
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V. WHAT THE STUDY OF THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR CAN
CONTRIBUTE TO LATCRIT
The process of research is not a one-way relationship; rather, it is a
mutual relationship. The researcher changes as she begins to understand
her own history, or she may find empathy as she begins to understand the
narrative of what had previously been an "other." Accordingly, the study
of the Spanish American War can contribute to the LatCrit project, as
discussed below in Part V.A, by helping to build a solid base for coali-
tions within different LatCrit communities, and in Part V.B, by develop-
ing a better understanding of the ideological and racial subordination that
impacts upon LatCrit communities.
A. Spanish American War Historiography and Interracial Coalition
Building
LatCrit theorists, like other Americans, have absorbed traditional
retellings of American history. However, in order to understand those at
the "bottom of the well,"' ' LatCrit theorists must transcend the "Ameri-
can" part of their hyphenated identities.2' To understand this period is to
know why this period remains traumatic and part of the present for Cu-
bans, Cuban Americans, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, Guamanians, and na-
tive Hawaiians and haunts Latin American sovereignty. For these peo-
ples, the Spanish American War is not a footnote but remains a crucial
turning point in their national histories. As LatCrit scholars, we need to
understand the emotion and continuing impact that the cry of Jose Martf,
"Patria o Muerte" (Country or Death), Cuba's nationalist poet and revo-
lutionary martyr, continues to bring to the breast of Cubans and Cuban
Americans, and why native Hawaiians continue to chant the prayer of
Queen Lili'uokalani, the last reigning monarch of the Kingdom of Ha-
waii.
Psychologists have begun to understand that knowledge is both af-
fective and intellectual.2 4 In studying the many single events that make
up this key period, LatCrit scholars can begin to know "subordination"
with a kind of personal knowledge that transcends the intellectual and
122. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTIOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM
(1992); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
123. For writings on Latino/as as "hyphenated" or "borderland" identities, see ILAN STAVANS,
THE HISPANIC CONDITION: REFLECTIONS ON CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN AMERICA 18-19 (i995);
RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRuTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS, at 196-217 (2d
ed. 1993) (Chapter 9, Border Crossings); GLORIA ANZALD0A, BORDERLANDS LA FRONTERA: THE
NEWMFrq'Z 21 (1987).
124. See ROBERTS. ROUPBERN-SEIN & MI-ILEL.,ROUr-BERNSIEIN, SPARKS OFGENIIUS: THE
THIRIEEN THINKING TOOLS OFTE WORLD'S MOST CREAIIVE PEOP (1999).
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combines it with empathy. 2 Understanding the loss and pain that these
groups relate back to the acts that accompanied the Spanish American
War is the first step to constructing the interracial alliances about which
LatCrit writes a great deal- but needs to do more. Perhaps only through
this kind of empathy, both intellectual and affective, can true interracial
alliances within LatCrit be formed.
B. The Spanish American War as a Centering Axis for LatCrit Analyses
Latin American post-colonial theorist, Walter Mignolo makes the
strongest case possible for the significance of the Spanish American War
when he asserts that this war is the lynchpin to understanding the raciali-
zation of Latinos/as in the United States, and U.S. relations with Latin
America. 12 The Anglocentric, Protestant framework that McKinley and
other politicians developed to justify and rationalize the Spanish Ameri-
can War reconfigured the "world imaginary," according to Walter Mi-
gnolo' 27 What were Hispanic and Catholic went from being powerful and
quintessentially modern to being powerless, backward, and the colo-
nized.'
McKinley's Protestant "civilizing mission" towards the people of the
Caribbean and the Pacific, which required teaching them the rubrics of
democratic self governance and, to a great extent, Protestantism,129 dis-
placed the Sixteenth Century's Spanish Catholic Kings' encomienda to
Catholocize the New World. 13 Mignolo argues that this ideology pro-
duced by the Spanish American War now shapes the "historicostructural
dependency" of "coloniality of power," which continues to influence
events in the United States, Latin America and the world. 3' "Coloniality
of power" in today's world implies the hegemony of Anglocentrism in
which new "dominated populations, in their assigned identities, [a]re
subjected to Anglocentric hegemony as a way of knowing." 32 This An-glocentric historicostructural legacy organizes the modern versus the
125. Philosopher Edmund Husserl proposed that by focusing on the act of "experiencing
something," rather than on the thing being experienced, one could produce a new kind of knowledge
more relevant to the human experience that went beyond scientific knowledge. EDMUND HUSSERL,
CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY (Dorion Cairns trans.,
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 4th impression 1970).
126. See WALTER D. MIGNOLO, LOCAL HISTORIES/GLOBAL DESIGNS 31-32 (2000).
127. Id. at 32.
128. Id. at 52-53.
129. McKinley was a devout Protestant during an age of renewed missionary efforts. See
MII.LER, supra note 41, at 24. Historian Creighton Miller argues that McKinley was "sincere" in his
belief that it was America's duty to uplift and civilize Filipinos. See iii
130. See generally BENJAMIN B. RINGER & ELINOR R. LAWLESS, RACE - ETHNICITY AND
SOCIErY (1989); KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA (1975).
131. See MIGNOLO, supra note 126, at 53-54.
132. Id. at 53 (drawing upon Foucault's subordinated knowledges and Ribeiro's subaltern
knowledges).
20011
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4
colonial.'33 This binary implies that an Anglocentric way of knowing
distinguishes between what is modem and colonial, what needs to be
modernized and what has already reached this plateau of development,
and what is valuable and what is not. This logic of modernity influences
modem global economic organization.1
34
Historians generally agree that the Spanish American War provided a
new value system for a more modem United States, one that progressed
from parochial interests to a global power. 35 The Spanish American War,
if one has not yet grown tired of the term, marks an internal paradigmatic
shift as well.' 36 As cultural historians and the longer work on which this
essay is based argue, the Spanish American War reconstituted the collec-
tive self as powerful, superior, and virtuous.'7 Pride in being American
translated into notions of superiority over a badly defeated Spain;
McKinley's appeal to "duty and obligation" meant providing "help" to
the new tropical peoples only available through American largesse and
genius.' In THE WAR WITH SPAIN, Henry Cabot Lodge, the paradig-
matic Anglo Saxonist, sums up a new sense of self and nationhood:
"Then the war note rang through the land, and with dazzled eyes at first,
and then with ever clearer and steadier gaze, they saw that in the years of
isolation and self-absorption they had built up a great world power....
133. See id. at 33.
134. See generally id. at 54-57.
135. The sources cited in footnote 3 suggest that the Spanish American War was a major event
for United States national identity and foreign policy. See also HEALY, supra note 3 (connecting
foreign policy and new cultural and racial attitudes); MAY, supra note 3 (transformation of the
United States into a new world power) MUSICANT, supra note 7 (emphasizing military aspects);
TRASK, supra note 41. Of course, authors emphasize different aspects of transformation. For
example, Hunt's analysis focuses on the relationship between a collective self identity based on
racial and cultural superiority and a more interventionist foreign policy: See HUNr, supra note 94, at
11-12 (discussing three core ideas relevant to foreign affairs; (1) the American future was defined as
an active quest for national greatness; (2) new racial hierarchies; and (3) revolutions in Latin
America were not acceptable because they could develop in dangerous directions). Petra DeWitt,
and I elaborate on the themes focusing on new racial constructions and how these affected
discussions of civic principles and eventually evolved into new legal constructions of de jure second
class citizenship. See generally, Lazos & DeWitt, supra note 4.
136. Robert Beisner catalogues the many ways that the Spanish American War represents a
"paradigm shift" in foreign policy and national identity. See generally BEISNER, DILOMACY, supra
note 3.
137. The cultural historians have taken the lead in developing this view of the subtle racial
political rhetoric that accompanied the approval of the Treaty of Paris and the annexation of the
insular territories. See generally HUNT, supra note 94; HEALY, supra note 3; BEISNER, ANTI-
IMPERIALISTS, supra note 3; MILL.ER, supra note 41; Lazos & DeWitt, supra note 4.
138. During the fall and winter of 1898 and 1899, McKinley stated that the "mandate of duty"
included "freedom from oppression and the maintenance of human rights" not just through war but
also through "guidance and protection." "Speech at Auditorium," Atlanta, Dec. 15, 1898, Reel 82,
Series 4, WMK; "Speech at Banquet," Savannah, Georgia, Dec. 17, 1898, Reel 82, Series 4, WMK.
He explained that "the genius of American civilization is understood in the remotest corners of the
earth to be... wise, beneficent.... and capable of conferring the blessings of unselfish leadership."
"Speech at Auditorium," Atlanta, Dec. 15, 1898, Reel 82, Series 4, WMK.
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Suddenly came the awakening to the great fact that they had founded an
empire ...."'39
Furthermore, this evolution of superior self-identity took place at a
time when racial constructs were in flux and Whiteness was under pres-
sure. In post-reconstruction, Black Americans failed to find racial equal-
ity. Rather, Whites had tired of the difficult task of eliminating caste, and
they acquiesced, albeit sometimes uncomfortably, to new modes of class
and racial subordination and stratification, which were particularly se-
vere in the South.' 40 Cultural ideas about race increasingly crept into how
Whiteness was constructed. The backlash against massive immigration
of European ethnics played into White Anglo Saxonist prejudices, which
were now framed against a White relational other-European ethnic im-
migrants.14' Those who were firmly White and American were those who
could claim old English and Anglo Saxon stock. The White ethnic others
were the Irish, racialized as ape-like, drunken and unruly, 42 the Jews
with racial traits of "vulgar ostentation,"' 43 and the Slavs, half-Asian and
half-Caucasian, who were the dupes of unscrupulous labor contracts that
undermined American wages. 44 Yet, in relation to Blacks and Indians,
these ethnic groups were White enough. 45
Not surprisingly, the new national self-identity and world order con-
structed after the Spanish America War came to be measured against the
"tropical peoples" of the new insular territories, another racial "other."
As the United States wrestled with the significance of annexing so large
139. HENRY CABOr LODGE, THE WAR WITH SPAIN 234 (1899). Lodge continues,
[n]ow men saw that the long connection, ever growing closer, with the Hawaiian
Islands had not been chance; that the culmination of the annexation movement in
the very year of the Spanish War was not accident, but that it all came from the
instinct of the race .. and that Americans, and none else, must be the masters of
the cross-roads of the Pacific.
Id. at 235.
140. On Black-White racial formation circa the Spanish American War, see generally W. E. B.
DUBOIS, THE SOUL OF BLACK FOLKS (1902); MICHAEL GOIDRTE1D, THE COLOR OF POII'CS: RAC2EAN
THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POUI.7CS (1997) (politics and history); RICHARD KLtJUGR, SIMPLE
JUSTCE(1986) (legal); C. VANNWOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW(3d ed. 1974) (politi-
cal scientist).
141. Historian Matthew Jacobson provides an in depth view of the tiering of Whiteness at the
turn of the century MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998); see also LEWIS H. CARLSON & GEORGE A.
COLBURN, IN THEIR PLACE: WHITE AMERICA DEFINES HER MINORITIES, 1850-1950 (1972).
142. The analysis of racializing of the Irish at the turn of the century, and how they "became
white" is now plentiful. See generally HUNT, supra note 94, at 52 (focusing on racializing and
stereotyping); NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995) (emphasizing labor and class
struggles); JACOBSON, WHITENESS & IMMIGRANTS, supra note 141 (using cartoons); ROEDIGER,
supra note 125 (becoming White by excluding Blacks).
143. See generally JACOBSON, WHITENESS, supra note 141, at 123-35, 164-67.
144. See HUNT, supra note 94, at 52. Slavs were particularly disliked because of their role as
scabs in labor strikes of the steel and coal mines. See JOHN HINGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND:
PATIERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1800-1925 102-105 (1972).
145. Jacobson's work is particularly strong in making this duality clear. See generally
JACOBSON, WHITENESS & IMMIGRANTS, supra note 141.
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a geographical territory filled with nine million foreign peoples, new
racial thinking began to take shape, made more palatable and transparent
by President McKinley's presidential rhetoric. McKinley argued that
retaining control of the Philippines was a duty, and only this alternative
would avoid a bloody civil war." 6 "Obligations" to a "higher and nobler
civilization"'47 made it necessary for the United States to annex the Phil-
ippines and Puerto Rico, in spite of these country's nationalist ambitions,
and maintain them under tutelage until they had sufficiently learned the
ways of American democracy.' 4' Under McKinley's rendition of the
"White Man's Burden,"'149 the Nation, civically privileged and responsi-
ble for ensuring the triumph of "civilized" (Anglocentric) norms, was
following the mandates of Providence'o and obeying Christian-like obli-
gations to the civilized world. This rhetoric made it possible to argue that
this imperialist experiment was not in the pursuit of commercial ambi-
tions151 or a response to racial attitudes towards those widely regarded as"barbarians." 52 Nonetheless, McKinley' s "benevolent assimilation" im-
146. "Abandoning" the insular territories would mean leaving them in a state of anarchy and
handing them over to "endless war and slaughter, and inviting foreign intervention." "Not
Delivered," Speech dated Oct. 1899, Reel 83, Series 4, WMK.
147. On his tour of western cities during the fall of 1898, McKinley stated that "territorial
expansion is not... always necessary to national achievement." However, McKinley thought there
had to "be a constant movement toward a higher and nobler civilization." And "in our present
situation, duty and duty alone should prescribe the boundary of our responsibilities." "For
humanity's sake, we must accept all obligations which ...duty and honor imposed upon us."
"Speech of President McKinley at the Banquet in the Auditorium," Chicago Illinois, Oct. 19, 1898,
Reel 82, Series 4, Speeches, WMK.
148. In these speeches, McKinley referred to the duty of the United States as not shirking its
responsibility toward those in need of the nation's wisdom, especially those who had become the
"wards" of the United States. "Speech at Banquet of Ohio Society," Mar. 3, 1900, Reel 83, Series 4,
Speeches, WMK.
149. Rudyard Kipling's poem, 'The White Man's Burden," was first published in the United
States in February, 1899, as the battle for ratification of the Treaty of Paris raged in the Senate. In a
passage, Kipling described the duty of Anglo Saxons to serve the needs of "new caught, sullen
peoples, half devil, half child" who inhabited the lands coming "under the influence of western
civilization." Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden" (1899).
150. No matter how grave the problems or how embarrassing the situation, "they must be met
with courage and wisdom and we must follow duty. The genius of the nation, its freedom, its
wisdom, its humanity, its courage, its justice, favored by Divine Providence, will make it equal every
task and the master of every emergency." "Speech at Trans-Mississippi and International
Exposition," Omaha, Nebraska, Oct. 12, 1898, p. 22 of Speech, Reel 82, Series 4, Speeches, WMK.
151. The extent to which commercial ambition motivated the Spanish American War has been
the subject of heated debate between Marxist historians and the "realist" historians. Compare
LAFEBER, supra note 3 (arguing that the War was motivated by expansionist commercial ambition
and that McKinley was on board even prior to his election) with BEISNER, DIPLOMACY, supra note
3, at 22-23 (1975) (arguing that LaFeber's thesis that there was a unified policy by business interests
for economic expansionism is overstated; but agreeing that the urge for creating increasing markets
was a key element of the impetus for the war). But see FREIDEL supra note 1, at 15 (representing an
earlier view in categorically stating that Wall Street was not behind the War, rather it was fought for
moral and humanitarian reasons).
152. See generally MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, BARBARIAN VIRTUES: THE UNITED STATES
ENCOUNTERS FOREIGN PEOPLES AT HOME AND ABROAD, 1876-1917 (2000).
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ports racial attitudes, because only if these "wards" were racially and
culturally lesser peoples would it be logical for the United States to tutor
the theretofore unknown, but racially different.
As literary critic Eric Cheyfitz observes, the colonizer writes the
script in non-racial terms,"' and, in this case, "the civilized teach the non-
civilized." Nonetheless, this script carries racial effects, "White Anglo
Saxons teach the dark skinned barbarians." The racial script is unstated;
nevertheless, the spoken text is loaded with racial subtext. The public
rhetorical vehicle, because it is devoid of explicit racial references and
instead appeals to self virtue and abnegation, can preserve the self-
delusion of racial innocence and virtue.M This racial construction, which
subtly denigrates non-Anglo Saxon cultures in non-racial terms, is a dy-
namic that continues with us today. Whiteness is transparent and inno-
cent, supported by assumptions of Anglo cultural superiority and privi-
lege.' 5 Thus, the American psyche maintains distance from the conse-
quences of its own colonialist acts through the rhetorical constructs that
preserve American innocence devised originally by McKinley.
Walter Mignolo would understand this cultural ideological conver-
sion locally, as well as globally. Mignolo argues that the new racial and
cultural thinking formed after the Spanish American War recast past
events, including the U.S.-Mexico War of 1848, Mexican Americans,
Mexicans, along the racial Anglocentric lines. 6 In contrast, historian
David Weber and Chicano sociologist Rodolfo Acufla, among others,
view pre-existing racial attitudes towards Indians and Catholics as pro-
viding the ideological framework for the racialization of Mexico and
Mexicans.'5 Further, Mignolo argues, as have historians Michael Hunt,
153. See ERIC CHEYFITZ, THE POEFICS OF IMPERIAUSM TRANSLATION AND COLONIZATION
FROM THE TePESTTO TARZAN 3-6 (1991).
154. Id.
155. See CRIICAL WHIT STUDIES (Richard Delgado & Jesu Stefancic eds. 1997).
156. See MIGNOLO, supra note 126, at 32; see also discussion supra Part V.B. and
accompanying text.
157. Historian David Weber argues that White Southerners who settled in Texas already
regarded Mexicans as racial others given the amount of intermixing of White and indigenous blood.
As well, the animosity felt towards Mexicans was derivative of English antipathy towards the
Spanish and Catholicism. As a result, Americans' prevailing attitude towards Mexicans was that
they were "indolent, ignorant, bigoted, cheating, dirty, blood-thirsty, cowardly half-breeds." DAVID
J. WEBER, Introduction to FOREIGNERS IN THEIR NATIVE LAND: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE
MEXICAN AMERICANS 59-60 (David J. Weber ed., 1973) (citing contemporaneous accounts).
Acuna's work views the Mexican American War as part of an internal racial conquest motivated
largely by pre-existing racial attitudes, the ideology of manifest destiny and Americans' greed for
land. See RODOIO. ACUIRA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 13-21 (3d ed. 1988).
Rodolfo Alvardz has argued that if a social system and economic structure have been racialized
because of historical, social, economic, and class dynamics, new entrants will become "incorporated
into an already thoroughly structured, thoroughly defined, social situation." See Rodolfo Alvardz,
The Unique Psycho-Historical Experience of the Mexican-American People, 52 SOC. SC. Q. 15, 20-
21 (1971). Tomtls Almaguer and Neil Foley associate the development of racial attitudes in the
Southwest as being more closely linked to the conflict over control of lands, and with an eventual
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David Healy, and Robert Beisner, that the cultural ideology and national
identity developed during the Spanish American War accounts for the
heavy handed treatment of Latin America after 1900 and the too frequent
interventions in Latin America's internal affairs.""
Mignolo's thesis, even if not in agreement with the established wis-
dom of Chicano scholars, provides an overarching structure that connects
the present effects of the Spanish American War described in Part li 9
These events could be said to be related only through a common history;
however, Mignolo provides a new understanding that makes it possible
to see that Anglo Saxonism and its relational converse, Hispanic inferior-
ity, form a common ideology that continues to shape both local and
global subordination. ° As Professor Lisa Iglesias has noted, it is possi-
ble "to seek the commonalties of oppressions without collapsing. . . dis-
tinct histories into one false norm ... [and] the payoff is a new perspec-
tive....." 16
VI. TURNING THE CRITICAL EYE INWARD
In this Part, I turn the critical eye inward and discuss the criticisms
that can be leveled at LatCrit theorists' approach to the analysis of the
Spanish American War. This Part continues the process of self-criticism
and self-reflection that the LatCrit II, I and IV Forewords by Professors
Frank Valdes, Lisa Iglesias and Associate Dean Kevin Johnson have
argued is an integral part of LatCrit methodology. 162
Part VI.A posits that the LatCrit enterprise is culturally and racially
positioned in much the same way that Part IV argued that American his-
toriography on the Spanish American War is culturally and racially posi-
tioned. Part VI.B addresses the question of how LatCrit theorists should
address the problem of the positioned analyst.
occupational stratification that relegated Mexican and Mexican Americans to labor and field labor.
TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULTlINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY IN
CALIFORNIA (1994); NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE (1998).
158. See discussion supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
159. See discussion Part V.B.
160. See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Globalization or Global Subordination?: LatCrit Links the
Global to the Local and the Local to Global, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1429 (2000) (explaining that
understanding local racial dynamics informs how to understand global subordination and vice versa).
161. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword: Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power,
Inter/National Labor Rights and the Evolution of LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 575, 592 (1999); see also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of the Shadow: Marking Intersections In
and Between Asian Pacific American Critical Legal Scholarship and Latinalo Legal Theory, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 349, 358 (1998).
162. Francisco Valdds, Foreword: Under Construction -- LatCrit Consciousness, Community,
and Theory, 85 CAL L. REV. 1087 (1997) (LatCrit II); Iglesias, Foreword, supra note 161, at 58
(LatCrit III); Kevin R. Johnson, Foreword - Celebrating LatCrit Theory: What are We Going to Do
When the Music Stops? 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753 (2000). (LatCrit IV).
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A. The LatCrit Analyst as a "Positioned" Researcher
The LatCrit analyst, like the traditionally minded historian, is a posi-
tioned subject in the manner that Rosaldo and Geertz describe, because,
first, she is positioned within the field as a race theorist, and second, the
approach of her discipline, the law, also influences her analysis of his-
torical events.
1. Field Positionality: LatCrit is Culturally and Racially Positioned
LatCrit, as well as Critical Race Theory, is "positioned"' 6 within the
legal field. These jurisprudential approaches analyze legal issues by fo-
cusing on how racial dynamics function in legal contexts.' 6' For example,
in the study of the Spanish American War, LatCrit analyst could be said
to choose a theory of racial formation as the theoretical framework that
she believes best explains these historical events.'6' Historical facts are
then interpreted through a "race" lens. These culled historical facts are
used to "prove" the initial premise that some form of racial framework
shaped the subsequent events related to the Spanish American War. The
analyst links seeming unrelated events, and this linking shows the sys-
temic existence of the racial formation framework. As justified in RACE
AND RACES, by organizing "seemingly unrelated law" and historical
events around a racial premise, they "come together."'6 The results of
such analysis are linear, continuous, and coherent.
This exercise can be said to be circular, because the analyst, as an-
thropologist Renato Rosaldo describes, comes to the subject with her
own cultural perspective, through which she filters what she observes
and evaluates. The work of sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, a cultural soci-
ologist, also emphasizes that the researcher can distort social scientific
work because the researcher may project either "animosity" or "en-
chantment" to her understandings of how a discipline functins.
163. By the term "posititions," I mean that the therorist holds a cultural position (which
includes all apsects of identity and class) that inevitably influences how she analyzes her subject).
See discussion infra notes 167, 174-75, 181 and accompanying text.
164. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT THE
CENTURY'S END 224-229 (1995) (stating how CRT fits into other jurisprudential approaches that
currently dominate law).
165. See e.g., Perea, Manifest Destiny & Conquest, supra note 2, at 1 (stating more
specifically, Juan Perea uses Albert Memmi's post colonial thesis that racism is a necessary
justification for nakedly aggressive military conquests and expansions); Ramos, supra note 4, at
285-88 (Professor Efren Rivera Ramos develops a complex theoretical framework of "ideology of
expansion" into which he incorporates cultural ideological hierarchies (Anglocentrism), pre-existing
racial beliefs towards Indians and blacks, class hierarchies effected by capitalist institutions and
markets, and traditional American beliefs in manifest destiny).
166. See PEREA, RACE AND RACES, supra note 2, at 3.
167. See ROSALDO, supra note 123, at 168-195 (Chapter 8, Subjectivity in Social Analysis).
168. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, HOMO ACADEMICUS 1-25 (Peter Collier trans., 1988) (Chapter 1,
A Book for Burning?) (demonstrating the work of Bourdieu can not be easily classified, nonetheless,
his work is clearly aligned with Max Weber's views of institutional legitimacy and status, concepts
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Sometimes the interest of the researcher manifests itself by selective
presentation of historical facts and events in a way that best "proves" a
thesis. History then becomes straightforward. Such critique could be lev-
eled at an interpretation, such as that of Professor Juan Perea, that racial
attitudes toward dark skinned others underlie the "racial conquest" of the
U.S.-Mexico War and the Spanish American War.' 9 Similarly, it could
also be said, to apply Professor Roman's emphasis on Anglocentrism as
the central motivation in a century of doctrinal development and legisla-
tive enactments that have led to Puerto Rico's present de jure second-
class status.' 70 As well, Professor Rivera Ramos' explanation that the
"ideology of expansion" was the primary influence in the Insular
Cases 17 could be said to focus on only one of the many ongoing dynam-ics changing American attitudes towards the rest of the world.
Such work is very much what LatCrit encourages and builds upon,
because LatCrit, like CRT, endeavors to reveal how seemingly neutral
laws and political acts embody racial bias.For readers who cannot see
racial privilege because it operates in transparent ways or do not believe
that racism exists because it is located in the past, such an approach can
make it possible "to make... connections among race, history, and legal
doctrine.' ' 173 This is because American culture is itself "positioned," as
anthropologists Rosaldo and Geertz emphasize. 4 In particular, American
culture contains a quality that analysts capture under the rubric of cul-
tural ideology. 75 This dynamic permits those living within this culture to
ignore, or minimize, the racial injustices of the past, while preserving the
myth that the positive and self-affirming qualities, like fairness, merit,
and exceptionality are intrinsic to American culture and have always
dominated. 6 In spite of collective amnesia or repudiation of past racial
of the symbolic power of language developed by speech act theorists, and Foucault's post-structural
notions of privileged knowledges and their relationship to power). See generally DAVID SWARTZ,
CULTURE & POWER: THE SOCIOLOGY OF PIERRE BOURDIEU (1997).
169. See Perea, Manifest Destiny & Conquest, supra note 2, at 2 ("The proximity, the
resources, the economic opportunities, the wealth, and the strategic value of lands makes them
desirable. But the darker skin of the inhabitants of those desirable lands has led to conquest.").
170. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
172. See supra part III.
173. See PEREA, RACE AND RACES, supra note 2, at 3.
174. See supra bite 163 abd discussion supra note 167 and accompanying text.
175. See Clifford Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPREATION OF CULTURES:
SELECTED ESSAYS BY CuM;ORD GmtRz 193-233 (1973) (Chapter 8 Ideology As a Cultural System)
(arguing that the function of ideology is to provide authoritative concepts that render culture meaningful,
the images by which it can be sensibly grasped); see also ROSAIJDO, supra note 123, at 30 ("[Ildeology
often makes cultural facts appear natural, social analysis attempts to reverse the process. It dismantles the
ideological in order to reveal the cultural, a peculiar blend of objective arbitrariness ... and subjective
taken-for-grantedness (it's only common sense - how could things be otherwise?)"); EUISABEIHYOUNG
BREHI, THEANATOMY OF PREJUDICES 97 (1996) (emphasizing the unconscious level at which ideology
functions; it (i) operates against self-consciousness and thereby avoids rigorous reasoned examination,
and (ii) protects against revealing internal contradictions because they are pervasive and self-reinforcing).
176. Sociologist Jeffery Praeger describes ideology as follows:
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politics, past ideologies live in the present, because cultural ideology has
"a life of its own."'" Yet, as historian Michael Hunt observes, "race
powerfully shaped the way the nation dealt with other peoples by its grip
on the thinking of the men who debated and determined _policy, by its
influence over the press, and by its hold on the electorate."
1
Nonetheless, practitioners of LatCrit, like their counterparts in CRT,
must recognize that their fields stake a position. CRT and LatCrit stake
an approach that is culturally and racially positioned, which I will refer
to as field positionality. Admittedly there is great variation in how indi-
vidual practitioners understand and apply CRT and LatCrit.'79 Nonethe-
less, there is a commonality. First, these are fields of cultural critique,
because at the center of this work is an ongoing effort to show how
mainstream cultural norms maintain racial inequality. Second, these
fields share a commitment to viewing the world through a racial lens in
order to uncover how laws are racially unjust."s As Bourdieu notes, all
systemic theoretical frameworks within a discipline imply a viewpoint,
even if "the intention [is] abolishing one's viewpoint," ' and even if they
claim their approach furthers social justice.
2. Disciplinary Positionality: Law's Troubled Relationship with His-
tory
A second set of perspective issues, which I refer to as "disciplinary
positionality," affects LatCrit work, as well. This is the perspective that
legal scholars in general bring to historical work.
The vast majority of legal scholars who "do" history are not trained
as historians. For this reason, Judge Richard Posner is openly skeptical of
whether judges and legal scholars can perform competent historical-legal
Ideology comes to be mistaken for reality. The images that are evoked concerning
racial groups come to be the prism through which observation of the real social
world is conducted. Only the passage of time and the emergence of new
understandings reveal how previous efforts to comprehend differences ... serve
to justify and, in a limited sense, legitimate inequity ... Any racial ideology is
inadequate so far as it cannot comprehend the individual in the groups. What
stands for explanation at the ideological levels easily dissolves when confronted
with social reality. . . . Ideology . . . represents the dominant, more or less
culturally universal scheme by which social order is understood and explained.
Jeffrey Praeger, American Ideology as Collective Representation, 5 ETHNIC RACIAL STUD. 98, 101
(1984); see also Lazos, Homo[geneous], supra note 98, at 1567-72.
177. See HUNT, supra note 94, at 12. ("Ideological constructs, which culture not only inspires
but also sustains and constrains, as serving as a fount for an instructive and reassuring sense of
historical place, as an indispensable guide to an infinitely complex and otherwise bewildering
present, and as a basis for moral action intended to shape a better future.").
178. Id. at 52.
179. See discussion supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
180. See e.g., discussion supra Part IV (showing how such a perspective can contribute a great
deal to historical analysis of the Spanish American War).
181. BOURDIEU, supra note 168, at 6.
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analysis.'8 Posner advises that history not be used to inform legal analy-
sis unless a historical fact is uncontroverted in the historical field.'8 3 Fur-
ther, Posner believes that the use of history is dangerous, because it en-
courages judges and scholars to duck difficult questions by referring to
some questionable historical explanation.' 84 Professor Mark Tushnet and
Judge Harry Edwards view attempts by legal analysts to "do" history as
typically arrogant, and more notable for the slip-shod nature of the effort
than for its scholarly merit.'5
With notable exceptions, it is generally true that legal scholars do not
"do" history, rather they use it for their own purposes. Chief Justice
Warren famously observed that "[w]e, of course, venerate the past, but
our focus is on the problems of the day and the future as far as we can
foresee it."' By contrast, the ideal within the discipline of history is to
ascertain the past as best as possible, without injecting "presentist" val-
ues or perspective.8' The task is to provide as accurate a rendition of past
events as is possible. Historians pride themselves in allowing the data to
speak to the analyst. Historians "do" history by inductive reasoning, ex-
amining individual documents, deciphering the why of individual events,
plowing through key debates, and piecing events into a coherent policy.
This is what constitutional legal scholar Bruce Ackerman has described
as a "no nonsense, original source" style. "8
The positive of this painstaking approach is that, first, the "proof' of
a conclusion is being laid out as the historian works through the material;
and second, that the material itself yields nuances and leads to avenues of
182. See Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism and Critique of History in
Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 CHI. L. REV. 573 (2000).
183. Id. at 573.
184. Id. at 583.
185. See Mark A. Tushnet, Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 67 CHI. L. REV. 573
(1992) (observing that legal scholars believe that they can enter any other discipline on the basis of
their generalized intelligence and interest yet eschew the necessity of having to go through the long
period of apprenticeship) (statement of Professor Tushnet) ("[It is the] professor as astrophysicist
assumption" because the law professor assumes that she "can read a physics book over the weekend
and send a rocket to the moon on Monday."); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Mark A Tushnet,
Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case Of History-In-Law 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (1996).
186. See Arthur S. Miller, The Elusive Search for Values in Constitutional Interpretation, 6
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 499 (1979) (quoting Chief Justice Warren).
187. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: 'THE OBJECTIVITY QUESTION' AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 1-2 (1988) (describing this as the "objectivist creed" and
applying the insights of Geertz and other cultural anthropologist and sociologist; Novick posits that
the objectivist creed is not achievable); see also LAURA KALIMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 170-85 (1996); Daniel R. Ernst, The Critical Tradition in the Writing of American
Legal History, 102 YALE L.J. 1019 (1993); Jane Larson & Clyde Spillenger, That's Not History: The
Boundaries of Advocacy and Scholarship, 12 PUB. HISTORIAN 33, 38 (1990) (pointing out that such
objectivity is aspirational, and "fairness and credibility" may be a more achievable goal).
188. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations 219 (1991).
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investigation previously unforeseen. Only after examining voluminous
data do historians move on to construct a thesis, or more encompassing
observations.
The negative of this approach is that too many disjointed facts may
not yield an overarching thesis that is coherent.) 9 The New York Times
has recently reported that historians are increasingly recognizing that
sweeping synthesis and elegant narratives by historians are rare today.' 9
Posner argues that focus on the past may yield perspectives that are
overly tied to the past. They may either no longer be relevant to present
day concerns or overly glorify a past that robs present day actors of the
ability to move beyond old conflicts and hurts to address constructively
present day problems.1 9'
On the other hand, legal scholars' methods are not as careful as his-
torians' methods. As already intimated, many legal scholars "do" history
by "picking and choosing" historical data and historiographical analysis
that is best suited for his or her "present day viewpoint." There are nota-
ble exceptions, as for example, Professor Michael McConnell's historical
work on the Fourteenth Amendment that leads him to conclude that
Brown v. Board of Education was rightly decided based on the history of
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment."" Further, legal scholars,
may take shortcuts in their historical research. There are few incentives
for legal scholars who "do" history to "get their hands dirty" by dipping
into the archives themselves. Secondary sources are widely used. The
reasons are twofold. First, this is accepted within the legal academic dis-
cipline. Second, this may well be necessary. Primary research tends to be
time consuming. Given the ongoing "publish or perish" pressures of
modern academia, the use of secondary sources expedites publication.
This combination of presentist agenda and short cut historical meth-
ods can be an explosive mix. As historian and legal analyst Laura Kal-
man notes, legal scholars can "appropriate historians for advocacy pur-
poses, permitting the present to overwhelm the past."' 93 It has even been
argued that legal scholars (or courts) are just plain wrong on their histori-
cal facts. Worse, the lack of peer-edited journals in law means that a le-
189. See KALMAN, supra note 187, at 183 (calling this "contextual antiquariarism").
190. See David Oshinsky, The Humpty Dumpty of Scholarship: American History Has Broken
in Pieces. Can It Be Put Together Again?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2000, at B9.
191. See Posner, supra note 182, at 578 (citing Friedrich Nietzche, "History in the Service and
Disservice of Life") ("Too much history, or history of the wrong kind.., fans emotions that impede
achievement."); see also KALMAN, supra note 187, at 334 n.32 (quoting C. Vann Woodward as
calling this "the built-in obsolescence of the lessons taught by historians").
192. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947 (1995) (noting similar criticisms have been leveled at the civic republicanism movement,
particularly Bruce Ackerman's interpretation of constitutive moments when the "people" change the
meaning of the Constitution through political action).
193. See Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 103 (1997).
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gal scholar can always publish a well-written article, even if it is based
on "history" that is rubbish.
B. Addressing the Conundrum of Positionality
How to respond to these issues? Should legal scholars abandon his-
tory? Part III made the case that understanding history is an important
part of the LatCrit project. This Part takes the position that the answer is
to understand the critiques and readjust approaches to historical work,
just as American historians have used internal critiques to reassess their
approaches to the analysis of the Spanish American War. Part VI.B.1
addresses the issues of what I have called field positionality, and Part
VI.B.2 addresses disciplinary positionality. Part VI.B. 1 takes the position
that the LatCrit researcher should, first, be self aware of her perspective
and undertake self-scrutiny to raise her awareness of her perspectivity,
assumptions, as well as interests in undertaking research. Part VI.B.2
argues that the researcher should also ground her work by using tradi-
tional historical methods, such as archival research. A LatCrit re-
searcher's conclusions should not only be persuasive, she should also be
able to conclude that her interpretation is both fair and reasonable.
1. Addressing Field Positionality: The Struggle for Objectivity
The racial and cultural positionality of LatCrit and other similar ap-
proaches was described in Part VI.A.I as a position of cultural critique.
Academic traditionalists have reacted by arguing that such critiques de-
stabilize the practices that traditional scholars have customarily used to
measure academic product, what is "truth" and what is "good" in schol-
arship. For example, David Harlan in THE DEGRADATION OF HISTORY
laments the impact of postmodern thought on historical practice.' 94
Harlan asks, "What now becomes of the 'historical fact' ... ?"' Harlem
states that "[t]he overwhelming abundance of possible contexts and per-
spectives, the ease with which we can skip from one to another, and the
lack of any overarching meta-perspective from which to evaluate the
entire coagulated but wildly proliferating population of perspectives-all
this means that the historical fact, once the historian's basic atomic unit,
has jumped its orbit and can now be interpreted in any number of con-
texts, from a virtually unlimited range of perspectives."19 He concludes
that this kind of questioning eliminates any "hope of acquiring stable,
reliable, objective interpretations of the past."''
Within the legal academe, Professors Farber and Sherry echo this
view. In BEYOND ALL REASON, they argue that CRT only seeks to "ex-
194. See DAVID HARLAN, THE DEGRADATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1997).





pose" racial "pathologies."' ' They accuse CRT theorists of refusing to
reason because they view "reason [as] a political entity" designed to en-
sconce racism, sexism, and homophobia.' 9 Farber and Sherry also charge
that critical theorists believe that justice is merely a "rhetorical device."
They question critical scholars' commitment to academic values, claim-
ing that these "radicals... have relatively little interest in the nuances of
philosophical theories," are "sloppy scholars" and are "paranoid in style
and rigi[d]."' '
What is at play here is a fundamental schism. It is what Thomas
Kuhn describes as an irresolvable paradigm gap. John Rawls calls this
"diversity of reasonable comprehensive . . . doctrines [that] ... is a per-
manent feature of the public culture of democracy."'  Although Rawls
and Kuhn come to this kind of problem from very different perspectives
and disciplines, both respond to this problem by recommending that en-
gagement continue between perspectives.
Engagement, however, cannot occur without self-awareness.
Bourdieu calls this process the struggle for objectivity.m Self-awareness,
for Bourdieu, means as well that the social researcher must understand
her social motivations and interests that are involved in her intellectual
practice.2" He observes that academics, as producers of cultural knowl-
edge, have an interest in what kind of knowledge is produced. 207 That
interest may be a larger group interest, such as, for example, a leftist po-
litical agenda, or it could be personal, such as a researcher's personal
desire for status within her profession."
The process of self-criticism, then, first entails asking questions that
uncover what, if any, are the underlying interests of the researcher. She
should ask: Why is she undertaking this study? How does this study af-
198. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND AL. REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT
ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 25 (1997). See also ARTHUR AUSTIN, THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK:
OUTSIDERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER LEGAL EDUCATION (1998).
199. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 198, at 25.
200. Id. at 24-25 (citing Bell's view that "law ... and . . . courts are 'instruments for
preserving the status quo' and only 'periodically and unpredictably' serve as a 'refuge of oppressed
people"').
201. Id.
202. See THOMAS S. KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUIONS (3d ed. 1996).
203. JOHN RAWLS, POLTICAL LIBERALISM 36 (paperback ed. 1996). Rawls presupposes that
participants in society will always disagree because incompatible philosophies are the natural result
of human reason. "Diversity of reasonable comprehensive . . . doctrines found in modem ...
societies is not a mere historical condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the
public culture of democracy." Id.
204. KUHN, supra note 202, at 202-03; RAWLS, supra note 203, at 36-37.
205. BOURDIEU, supra note 168, at 6.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1-25 (Chapter 1, A Book for Burning?) (providing an in-depth discussion of this
concept).
208. Id. (providing additional discussion).
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fect me? Does this study enhance my status? By understanding if we
ourselves are invested in an outcome, we can begin to obtain the objec-
tivity necessary to uncover "true" social facts.
The second step for the LatCrit analyst is to be self-conscious of the
assumptions brought to the research. Rosaldo writes that the researcher
constantly must consider her position and the subject's, never losing
sight of the dynamics of relative dominance and subordination.m For
historian Peter Novick, the analyst must recognize the social, political,
cultural, and professional context of the past as well as the present.
210
Legal feminists and postmodernists have framed this dilemma in terms of
an analyst accepting that her viewpoint and assumptions may not be the
,,truth. , 211
Starting with a higher awareness of unstated assumptions and that
one's working theoretical premises are subject to contest engrains higher
self-skepticism that produces more care in the reasoning process. If the
researcher constantly keeps in mind that her own positions are contest-
able, the analyst will spend more effort in substantiating and justifying
her own positions, findings, and conclusions. In another context, I have
advocated a form of reasoning based on John Rawls' concept of "recip-
rocity 2 12 in which actors, who understand that their position may not be
the absolute truth and is contestable, reason with each other according to
an ethic that justifies "their actions byr giving reasons that the other will
understand and reasonably accept. Reciprocity means participants
"hold each other in enough regard that each would justify their actions by




209. ROSALDO, supra note 123, at 168-95 (Chapter 8, Subjectivity in Social Analysis)
(discussing how culture and their "positioned subjects" are laced with power and power in turn is
shaped by cultural forms. Like form and feeling culture and power are inextricably intertwined. In
discussing forms of social knowledge, both of analysts and of human actors, one must consider their
social positions).
210. NOVIMC, supra note 187, at 11-12, 628.
211. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUsION AND
AMERICAN LAW 376 (1990) ("[Tlhe perspective of those who are labeled 'different' . . . is a
corrective lens, another partial view, not the absolute truth."). See generally Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 884 (1990) ("if truth is understood as partial and
contingent, each individual or group can approach its own truths with a more honest, self-critical
attitude about the value and potential relevance of other truths."); Lazos, Democracy & Inclusion,
supra note 98, at 211 ("To include [minorities' viewpoints] requires that we abandon certainty that
our own 'truths' . . . are the universal truth, and open ourselves to the possibility that the 'truth' we
have come to accept is contestable."); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term Foreword:
Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (arguing that judges should be aware of their
unstated point of reference when assessing others).
212. Cf. Lazos, Democracy & Inclusion, supra note 98, at 206-33 (discussing how a judge can
avoid racial positionality when judging racial issues).
213. RAWLS, supra note 203, at xliv.
214. Id. at 137.
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As applied to scholarly research, this method requires the researcher
to ask whether her conclusions "make sense" from opposite perspectives.
The researcher would ask if someone else could reasonably accept her
position and assumptions, even if that person does not share the re-
searcher's views or assumptions. The researcher may well not be able to
convince that imaginary adversary; however, she can engage the opposi-
tion viewpoint. The researcher must consciously justify her choice of
parameters, provide sufficient evidence to rebut the other viewpoint, and
show how her chosen use of historical evidence and methods does not tilt
the evidence and her conclusions.
It must be acknowledged, nonetheless, that this proposed method
remains imperfect. Bourdieu warns that adopting a self-critical position
does not mean that the researcher escapes positionality.215 In a similar
vein, Geertz and Rosaldo acknowledge that the observer can never fully
216
abandon the power she exercises. We only partially escape from ideo-
logical frameworks in which one is invested. However, acknowledging
that positionality is inescapable does not necessarily lead to weaker
analysis or less critical positions. Rather, it only means that critique is
undertaken with care. Particularly for fields like LatCrit and CRT, which
are fields of cultural critique, such care is important because critique, as
Bourdieu warns, can be another tool for gaining power and status."8 A
researcher can enhance her own status within a discipline or field by
criticizing others, for research can be undertaken for the purpose of
showing why my chosen theoretical framework is "true" or "neutral"-in
Bourdieu's terminology, legitimately produces social knowledge while
219yours does not.
2. Addressing Disciplinary Positionality: Anchoring Critical Per-
spectives with Historical Methods
Part VI.A.2 identified the disciplinary positionality affecting LatCrit
as the presentist viewpoint that characterizes all legal analysis. The legal
field practices law by examining the rules in the present, questioning
whether current applications preserve the values of law, rationality, pre-
dictability, and fairness. Yet the law is not an entirely presentist disci-
pline, although some fields within law, like the law and economics
school, would argue that this should be so.2 The common law method
215. See BOURDIEU, supra note 168, at 6.
216. See Geertz, supra note 175, at 27; see also ROSAIDO, supra note 123, at 168-195
(Chapter 8, Subjectivity in Social Analysis) (discussing the observer's power).
217. BOURDIEU, supra note 168, at 6.
218. Id. at 20-24.
219. Id.
220. For example, Posner argues that the legal method constrains but that judges nonetheless
manipulate outcomes. Posner proposes to reconcile the gap between law's indeterminacy and
judges' need to appear neutral "by turning law into something else - economics perhaps." RICHARD
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means that history is always relevant to the endeavor of assessing and
reassessing the adequacy of present day rules. On the other side of the
ledger, historians' disciplinary positionality is a commitment to a histori-
cal viewpoint. Like lawyers, historians cannot abandon the essence of
their discipline.
Nonetheless, the schism between law's presentist concerns and his-
tory's attention to historical facts is not as great as it seems, because this
seeming disciplinary divergence is increasingly blurring. First, historians
have always recognized that presentist viewpoints play a role in their
discipline. For example, in 1958 historian C. Vann Woodward made the
familiar argument that historical lessons should be relevant to the pre-
sent. History should not be "something unpleasant that happens to other
people," but instead, it should serve to teach about ideals, values, and
principles. "America ... desperately needs criticism from historians of
her own who can penetrate the legend without destroying the ideal, who
can dispel the illusion of pretended virtue without denying the genuine
virtues."22' 1
Second, historians are increasingly viewing their mission of ascer-
taining the "facts" as more of an interpretive mission rather than an ob-
jectivist one. In THAT NOBLE DREAM, historian Peter Novick posits that
the objectivist creed is an ideal; "truth" and absolute objectivity is not
attainable. m In spite of David Harlan's lament, Novick does not see infi-
nite interpretations as the result of recognition that absolute objectivity is
no longer possible. Rather, Novick, while emphasizing the uncertainty of
the enterprise of historical research, also anchors the historian in the dis-
cipline's traditional values because he urges a healthy regard for the
process of proof, based both in empiricism and reason. Novick de-
scribes a process of accepting that there are various interpretations for a
set of data; however, empiricism, verification, and careful historical
methods limit what interpretations are plausible.224 The researcher, who is
often plagued by gaps in archival documents and conflicting possible
motivations, presents the most reasonable and fair interpretation of the
data, knowing that there may well be other competing interpretations that
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 124-25 (1990); see also Posner, supra note 182
(arguing that history should not be used in law unless it is uncontroverted).
221. C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History, Presidential Address before the
Southern Historical Association (1953) (1960), reprinted in CHRON. HiGH. ED., Jan. 14, 2000, at
BII.
222. NOVICK, supra note 187, at 2, 10, 584.
223. Id.
224. Novick uses the example of ROBERT W. FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE
CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974) who used empirical evidence to
support their argument that slavery was an economically viable labor system. Id. at 588-89.
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have just as much of a legitimate claim as does her own.2 The reader
determines plausibility based on the historian's persuasiveness.
This is a pragmatist position. It implicitly recognizes that a complete,
coherent meta-narrative may not be a plausible goal, either for history or
for law. The whole story might have to be told in piece-meal fashion or
alternatively, acknowledging the tentative nature of such a meta-
narrative. At times, sources may just refuse to yield clear-cut answers.
Conclusions, therefore, can be fuzzy, equivocal, and tentative. One way
to contend with these limitations is, as Novick suggests, for historians to
be more "self-conscious" about their work and engage with contempo-
rary and past interpretations.2 6
This self-reflective pragmatist viewpoint shows the way for a better
methodology for legal scholars. Legal scholars should understand that
history is both a social science and an empirical method. In metaphorical
terms, history can be understood as an impressionist tapestry: it consists
of a series of interpretations-often multiple and sometimes fuzzy-
based on piece-meal facts-the data that historians have been able to
recover from the past. History understood in this way invites the legal
scholar to view any single historian's work as just one argument in a
series of multiple persuasive arguments. Therefore, it might be unwise to
"pick and choose" just one or two historians for dressing up a legal
viewpoint. Rather, the legal scholar's use of historians' efforts requires
that the legal researcher contextualize that historian's work. Is this inter-
pretation reasonable? Is this conclusion hotly contested or highly plausi-
ble, according to other historians' work?
To answer these questions requires first, that the legal researcher
understand how that particular historian's work fits into work already
done. No historical researcher stands on her own, just as no legal scholar
stands alone. By situating individual historian's work, the legal re-
searcher can better understand to what extent that viewpoint is contest-
able, how well substantiated that particular viewpoint is and has been in
the past, and how much this historian departs from the established histo-
riography. This allows the legal researcher the possibility of discovering
historical work, which remains unacknowledged within the discipline of
history, and yet maintain the necessary skepticism to evaluate whether a
particular work is well-researched and grounded.
Second, the legal researcher should ground her interpretation of his-
tory and her own work by "getting her hands dirty" in the archives.
Looking at only secondary interpretative works will seldom be basis
enough to evaluate other's research. Primary research makes it possible
for the legal researcher to assess for herself which historical interpreta-
225. See Larson & Spillenger, supra note 187.
226. See NOVICK, supra note 187, at 17.
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tion is reasonable, what avenues to pursue, what research remains to be
done. Moreover, as Guadalupe Luna advocated at the LatCrit II confer-
ence, primary research enables the analyst to hear the stories that are
buried in the original documents.
What I advocate here is born of my own experience in researching
the Spanish-American War. I began this project by asking a legal ques-
tion: What had been the motivations of the negotiators of the Treaty of
Paris when they had purposefully excluded Puerto Ricans and Guamani-
ans from full citizenship status, in stark departure to the provisions of the
Treaty of Guadalupe? As a LatCrit scholar, I assumed that racial motiva-
tions had played a large role in this determination. Thus, I came to this
research with the field and disciplinary positionality described in this
Part. Expecting to find the "smoking gun" of racial motivation and racial
bias, I began examining historical archives, the McKinley presidential
papers, contemporaneous commentary, and the Congressional debates.
However, this research did not discover any smoking gun-such smok-
ing guns, I suspect, never do exist. Instead, I was confronted with evi-
dence and documents that supported the claims of innocent racial atti-
tudes and moral civic virtue that early American historiography had
viewed as the "true" motivations for this war. Documents directly show-
ing the private thinking processes of the important key actors were
scarce, and while public documents that claimed racial innocence were
plentiful, they deserved to be viewed skeptically.
Instead, the process of examining primary research and consulting
the old and new historiography made it 7ossible to develop a more com-
plex understanding of racial formation. Instead, the influence of racial
attitudes is highly integrated with other dynamics. The development of a
new national identity, born in competition with other world powers, was
at the core of the racial construction of the peoples of the insular territo-
ries. Aspirations of major world standing caused political leaders to push
the United States toward the annexionist position, even though from the
popular standpoint it is not clear that expansionism ever enjoyed wide
support. Although annexation was hotly debated at the time, what joined
all factions were the racial and cultural attitudes that made it inconceiv-
able to accept the peoples of the new insular territories as co-citizens.
The exclusion of these dark-skinned peoples from citizenship in the
Treaty of Paris was no accident, but neither was their relegation to a de
jure second class citizenship limbo clearly intended. Rather, the con-
struction of a racially tiered citizenship was the result of an incremental
process, at first ambivalent, then more resolute as time passed and colo-
nial policies became increasingly hidden from national consciousness.
McKinley's presidential rhetoric of racial innocence and national virtue,
227. See Lazos & DeWitt, supra note 4.
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the Supreme Court's politically pragmatic decision making, and the
eventual routineness of colonial administration, all played a role in nor-
malizing de jure second-class racial citizenship for the residents of the
insular territories.
This research has opened my eyes as to how tentative interpretations
of racial formation should be. The researcher must be wary of systemic
approaches because they oversimplify. Moreover, the legal researcher's
presentist viewpoint and deductive reasoning can easily eliminate the
fuzziness and ambiguity that are inherent to historical research enter-
prises. Race, as Professor Francisco Vald6s emphasizes, is highly com-
plex, "weblike" and multi-dimensional. It may well be that the dynam-
ics of race, class, culture, history, social cognition, and social group for-
mation may be too complex to be captured by overarching frameworks.
Finally, digging into dusty archives has its benefits. As Guadalupe
Luna reminds us, these documents can "speak to us." Hopefully, we will
listen.
228. See Francisco Valdes, Piercing Webs of Power: Identity, Resistance and Hope In LatCrit
Theory and Praxis, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897 (2000) (understanding that racial dynamics are made
up of multiple processes that can be interrelated and mutually reinforcing).
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